Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

Misunderstanding Rank

Martin (2013: 102):

Blogger Comments:

[1] The first sentence is misleading because it is not true. Since, by definition, an initiating move occurs earlier in a sequence than a responding move, these classifications do indeed sequence the moves.

[2] The second sentence is misleading because it is not true. For example, sequencing clauses in a clause complex does not require a higher ranking unit. Rank is a model of formal constituency (on strata that have forms). Higher ranks are motivated by having constituents.

[3] The third sentence is misleading because it is not true. The relation between ranks is not realisation, because ranks on a scale are all of the same level of symbolic abstraction. For example, the clause system of TRANSITIVITY is not realised by group functions such as Deictic and Auxiliary.

Not Recognising The Distinction Between Word As Grammatical And Word As Lexical

Martin (2013: 95): 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because SFL Theory also uses a constituency model, a rank scale, in which the word is a grammatical constituent. But SFL Theory also models the word as a lexical item, wherein it is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate grammatical features. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9):

The folk notion of the "word" is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. People "look for" words, they "put thoughts into" them, "put them into" or "take them out of another's mouth", and nowadays they keep collections of words on their shelves or in their computers in the form of dictionaries. Specialist knowledge is thought of as a matter of terminology. The taxonomic organisation of vocabulary is less exposed: it is made explicit in Roget's Thesaurus, but is only implicit in a standard dictionary. Lexical taxonomy was the first area of language to be systematically studied by anthropologists, when they began to explore cultural knowledge as it is embodied in folk taxonomies of plants, animals, diseases and the like.

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.. Word-based systems such as these do provide a way in to studying grammatical semantics: but the meanings they construe are always more complex than the categories that appear as formal variants, and grammarians have had to become aware of covert patterns.

Misunderstanding The Trinocular Perspective

 Martin (2013: 77):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands the trinocular perspective, since the trinocular perspective is concerned with levels of symbolic abstraction, whereas rank is a composition hierarchy, not a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction. That is, clauses are composed of groups, not realised by them; groups are composed of words, not realised by them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) explain:

A stratified semiotic defines three perspectives, which (following the most familiar metaphor) we refer to as 'from above', 'from roundabout', and 'from below': looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content, looking at it from below means treating it as the content of some expression, while looking at it from roundabout means treating it in the context of (i.e. in relation to other features of) its own stratum.

The Problem Of Grouping Declarative With Imperative

Martin (2013: 77):

Blogger Comments:

[1] For the generalisation lost in Martin's network, see the previous post.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the grammar is interpreted as the realisation of meaning. So declarative is "grouped" with interrogative, not imperative, under the superordinate indicative, because these two types of indicative are the congruent realisation of propositions, in contradistinction to imperative, which is the congruent realisation of a proposal.

[3] To be clear, the structural realisation of TENSE is specified in a verbal group network, not a clause network.

[4] To be clear, the problem with the MOOD network in Halliday & Matthiessen is easily rectified by adding a superscript 'I' to the system INDICATIVE TYPE, and a superscript 'T' to the system COMMENT. Problems with Martin's networks are not so easily rectified, as this blog has demonstrated.

The False Claim That The Architecture Of Language In SFL Is Founded On Axial Relations

Martin (2013: 75):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the examination of Chapter 4 demonstrated Martin's false claim that metafunction and rank are based on axis derives from his misunderstanding of axis and other factors, such as giving priority to the view 'from below' in devising systems, in contradistinction to SFL methodology.

[2] In this chapter, it will be seen that stratification, also, is not founded on axial relations. Consequently, the organisation of system networks in SFL, and its conception of the architecture of language, are not either, since these, too, are falsehoods deriving from the same misunderstandings.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, systems are not motivated by structure. This would be taking the perspective 'from below' (what systems do these structures realise?). In SFL Theory, the perspective taken is the opposite: 'from above' (how are these systems realised in structure?). This whole monograph is based on this misunderstanding (and the misunderstanding of axis).

Repeating A Bare Assertion That Assumes The Conclusion Of This Monograph

Martin (2013: 73):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. As the examination of this chapter has demonstrated, Martin has not shown that metafunction and rank are based on axis — nor could he.

As previously explained, Martin misunderstands axis as system/structure relations, as stipulated in realisation statements. In SFL Theory, axis is a local dimension whose two orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), with system and structure as their respective dimensions. Realisation statements are located on the paradigmatic axis, and as the name suggests, the relation between the axes is simply realisation.

Moreover, metafunction and rank are not based on either axis or system/structure relations. On the one hand, the metafunctions are a distinct global dimension from the local dimension of axis (ibid.), and first appeared in Language Structure and Language Function (Halliday 1970). 

On the other hand, the SFL approach to constituency, a rank scale, is a distinct local dimension  from the local dimension of axis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), and derives from the method of ranked constituency analysis, rather than immediate constituency analysis, as first set out in Categories of A Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961), and explained more fully in Introduction to Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985).

The rhetorical significance of Martin's misleading bare assertion (the ipse dixit fallacy) is that it assumes the conclusion (the petitio principii fallacy) of the entire monograph. That is, it is one logical fallacy serving another in an invalid argument for a false conclusion. In dialogue, the repeating of this bare assertion would be an example of the logical fallacy known as the argument from repetition.

Advocating A More Structural-Formal Approach To Systemic-Functional Grammar

Martin (2013: 69):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, as previous posts have demonstrated, this conclusion derives from privileging structure in devising systems, contrary to SFL methodology, and from confusing functions at clause rank with forms at lower ranks. It is thus an ill-conceived call for a systemic-structural functional-formal grammar to replace Systemic Functional Grammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning – it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organizing principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness …

It is because SFL gives priority to the higher level of abstraction (system and function), rather than the lower level of abstraction (structure and form), that its use for computerised parsing is more difficult. But the limitations of computers are no basis for making a theory less functional.

Martin's call for "restoring more of a balance" might be seen as an instance of the logical fallacy:

Argument to moderation (Latin: argumentum ad temperantiam) — also known as the false compromise, argument from middle ground, fallacy of grey, middle ground fallacy, or golden mean fallacy — is the fallacy that the truth is always in the middle of two opposites. It does not necessarily suggest that an argument for the middle solution or for a compromise is always fallacious, but rather applies primarily in cases where such a position is ill-informed, unfeasible, or impossible, or where an argument is incorrectly made that a position is correct simply because it is in the middle.

Confusing Systems Across Ranks

Martin (2013: 68-9):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these "inter-function dependencies" are inter-system relations at ranks below the clause. That is, this confuses clause rank functions, Subject, Finite, Complement, with the realisation of features of systems at lower rank, NUMBER, GENDER, CASE.

[2] To be clear, 'prosodic' is a type of structure, and a structure is the relationships that obtain between functions (elements) at given rank. It does not refer to a syntagm of forms, such as words or morphemes.

[3] To be clear, 'to follow Halliday's lead' is the default procedure, unless there are valid reasons for doing otherwise, because SFL Theory is his brainchild, and no-one else's. But the system of PERSON in the MOOD network is not concerned with the lower rank realisations that Martin confuses with clause rank here. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Confusing Ranks In Tagalog

Martin (2013: 68):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of a distinction in a clause rank, THEME CONFLATION, and realisation statements at clause rank only specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

Confusing Ranks

Martin (2013: 67-8):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are lower rank markers of a clause rank distinction, polarity, and realisation statements at clause rank only specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [4]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, since these are word rank forms marking different reference items. The 'reflexive' form marks an anaphoric reference to the Theme/Subject, whereas the other form does not.

To be clear, the same system "introduces" the Subject, Complement and Adjunct. That is, the MOOD system includes realisation statements that insert these functions in clause structure.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [2]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

[2] To be clear, it is not that these word rank markers of Subject and Finite — i.e. the view 'from below — constitute recognition criteria for Subject and Finite, but that the clause rank elements reprised in the Mood Tag identify the Subject and Finite of the clause.

[3] To be clear, in the system of MOOD, the realisation statement Subject^Finite for the feature informative "refers back" to the realisation statement +Subject for the feature indicative.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [1]

Martin (2013: 66-7):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the basic descriptive challenge alluded to here is said to arise from Martin's self-contradiction of privileging system by using structure to motivate systems.

However, this is misleading, because privileging system poses no challenge for describing clause rank systems, since these phenomena are word rank markers of clause rank functions. It is not that the Subject agrees with the verb, but the form of the word serving as the Head of the nominal group serving as Subject agrees with the form of the verb serving as Finite of the verbal group serving as Finite + Predicator.

This misunderstanding arises from confusing ranks and again viewing the clause 'from below', how it is realised, instead of 'from above', what it means.

It will be seen in the following posts that this confusion of function and form across ranks as "syntagmatic dependency relations between functions" is a persistent source of confusion for Martin.

Misrepresenting 'Rankshift' And 'Linker'

 Martin (2013: 65):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this misunderstands 'embedded' as a later renaming of 'rankshifted', whereas both terms are current, and present different views of the same phenomenon. For example, a nominal group that is embedded in a nominal group has shifted from group rank to word rank — words being the constituents of groups.

[2] To be clear, the structural analysis misrepresents of as a linker, despite the fact that a linker is a marker of a paratactic relation, and no paratactic relation obtains between the embedded nominal group and what follows. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 333) point out, the 'word of is the generalised marker of a structural relationship between nominals'. In such instances, of is a constituent of the prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier. Halliday (1994: 196):

Note that in Matthiessen's editions of IFG, the term 'Facet' has been shifted from the embedded Thing to the embedded nominal group as a whole, and from a Pre-Deictic to a Numerative function. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 335):

Note also that 'Qualifier' here should read 'Postmodifier'.

Misunderstanding System And Rank

Martin (2013: 63):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands system and rank. Realisation statements in a clause rank system specify clause rank structure, not the types of group rank units that realise clause rank functions.

Confusing Formal Constituency (Rank) With Function Structure

Martin (2013: 62):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, functions are not constituents of rank units, such as clause and nominal groups. Constituents of rank units are lower rank units on the rank scale. Constituents of clauses are groups and phrases.

The Thing is a function of a word, a constituent of a nominal group, and the structure of a rank unit is the relationships among the functions, not the functions themselves (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 451).

Misrepresenting Rank As Derived From System Networks

Martin (2013: 52):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday's concept of rank was first published in Categories of a Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961), five years before his first publication on system networks, Some Notes On 'Deep' Grammar (Halliday 1966), and nine years before the first publication on metafunctions, Language Structure and Language Function (Halliday 1970).

The rhetorical function of this misrepresentation is to support Martin's claim in this monograph that  "axial relations" are 'foundational'.

Misrepresenting Axis As the Origin Of Metafunction And Rank

Martin (2013: 52):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This gloss of the metafunctions is potentially misleading. The ideation metafunction is the construal of experience, not the construal of discourse, and the interpersonal metafunction is the enactment of interpersonal relations, not the enactment of discourse. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. … The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech roles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others. The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared.

[2] The claim that 'SFL's distinctive approach to meaning and constituency in fact grew out of the development of axis (system/structure relations) from the early 1960s' is very misleading because it is untrue on several counts.

Firstly, Martin misunderstands axis as system/structure relations, as stipulated in realisation statements. In SFL Theory, axis is a local dimension whose two orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), with system and structure as their respective dimensions. Realisation statements are located on the paradigmatic axis, and as the name suggests, the relation between the axes is simply realisation.

Secondly, the SFL approach to the metafunctions and constituency did not grow out of the development of either axis or system/structure relations from the early 1960's. 

On the one hand, the metafunctions are a distinct global dimension from the local dimension of axis (ibid.), and first appeared in Language Structure and Language Function (Halliday 1970). 

On the other hand, the SFL approach to constituency, a rank scale, is a distinct local dimension  from the local dimension of axis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), and derives from the method of ranked constituency analysis, rather than immediate constituency analysis, as first set out in Categories of A Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961), and explained more fully in Introduction to Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985).

The rhetorical significance of Martin's misleading bare assertion (the ipse dixit fallacy) is that it assumes the conclusion (the petitio principii fallacy) of the entire monograph. That is, it is one logical fallacy serving another in an invalid argument for a false conclusion.

Distinguishing Mood By Structural Realisation Instead Of The Meaning It Realises

Martin (2013: 43):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Here he also explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

And again, the inclusion of the verbal group feature 'non-finite' in this clause system confuses ranks, and misrepresents imperative clauses, which can include Finite and Subject elements, as non-finite.