Looking Up To Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 78):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misconstrues looking 'from above' as looking 'above' ("up"), and misleads by using this misinterpretation to claim that it is important to look at his discourse semantics, since it may be a rich source of interpreting grammatical structure.

[2] This misunderstands the significance of Halliday's observation of the natural relation between grammatical form and meaning — a relation which is not accommodated by Martin's discourse semantics. Halliday (1985: xvii, xviii, xix):

The relation between the meaning and the wording is not, however, an arbitrary one: the form of the grammar relates naturally to the meanings that are being encoded. A functional grammar is designed to bring this out; it is a study of wording, but one that interprets the wording by reference to what it means. …

What this means is that both the general kinds of grammatical pattern that have evolved in language, and the specific manifestations of each kind, bear a natural relation to the meanings they have evolved to express. … the distinction into word classes of verb and noun reflects the analysis of experience into goings-on, expressed as verbs, and participants in the goings-on, expressed as nouns; and so on. …

… the relation of grammar to semantics is in this sense natural, not arbitrary …

Misunderstanding The Realisation Of Tense In English

 Martin (2013: 72):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in the English TENSE system, the elements of the logical structure are not the individual words. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 398, 399):

… it is the logical structure that embodies the single most important semantic feature of the English verb, its recursive tense system, and the elements of the logical structure are not the individual words but certain rather more complex elements.

Advocating A More Structural-Formal Approach To Systemic-Functional Grammar

Martin (2013: 69):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, as previous posts have demonstrated, this conclusion derives from privileging structure in devising systems, contrary to SFL methodology, and from confusing functions at clause rank with forms at lower ranks. It is thus an ill-conceived call for a systemic-structural functional-formal grammar to replace Systemic Functional Grammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning – it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organizing principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness …

It is because SFL gives priority to the higher level of abstraction (system and function), rather than the lower level of abstraction (structure and form), that its use for computerised parsing is more difficult. But the limitations of computers are no basis for making a theory less functional.

Martin's call for "restoring more of a balance" might be seen as an instance of the logical fallacy:

Argument to moderation (Latin: argumentum ad temperantiam) — also known as the false compromise, argument from middle ground, fallacy of grey, middle ground fallacy, or golden mean fallacy — is the fallacy that the truth is always in the middle of two opposites. It does not necessarily suggest that an argument for the middle solution or for a compromise is always fallacious, but rather applies primarily in cases where such a position is ill-informed, unfeasible, or impossible, or where an argument is incorrectly made that a position is correct simply because it is in the middle.

Confusing Form(al) With Function(al)

Martin (2013: 69):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the 'agreeing' here is between forms, constituents, not functions. Here Martin is taking the view of Formal linguistics, not Functional linguistics.

Confusing Systems Across Ranks

Martin (2013: 68-9):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these "inter-function dependencies" are inter-system relations at ranks below the clause. That is, this confuses clause rank functions, Subject, Finite, Complement, with the realisation of features of systems at lower rank, NUMBER, GENDER, CASE.

[2] To be clear, 'prosodic' is a type of structure, and a structure is the relationships that obtain between functions (elements) at given rank. It does not refer to a syntagm of forms, such as words or morphemes.

[3] To be clear, 'to follow Halliday's lead' is the default procedure, unless there are valid reasons for doing otherwise, because SFL Theory is his brainchild, and no-one else's. But the system of PERSON in the MOOD network is not concerned with the lower rank realisations that Martin confuses with clause rank here. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [4]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, since these are word rank forms marking different reference items. The 'reflexive' form marks an anaphoric reference to the Theme/Subject, whereas the other form does not.

To be clear, the same system "introduces" the Subject, Complement and Adjunct. That is, the MOOD system includes realisation statements that insert these functions in clause structure.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [3]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank. The 'agreement' here is between word rank forms realising group rank functions, not between clause rank functions.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [2]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

[2] To be clear, it is not that these word rank markers of Subject and Finite — i.e. the view 'from below — constitute recognition criteria for Subject and Finite, but that the clause rank elements reprised in the Mood Tag identify the Subject and Finite of the clause.

[3] To be clear, in the system of MOOD, the realisation statement Subject^Finite for the feature informative "refers back" to the realisation statement +Subject for the feature indicative.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [1]

Martin (2013: 66-7):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the basic descriptive challenge alluded to here is said to arise from Martin's self-contradiction of privileging system by using structure to motivate systems.

However, this is misleading, because privileging system poses no challenge for describing clause rank systems, since these phenomena are word rank markers of clause rank functions. It is not that the Subject agrees with the verb, but the form of the word serving as the Head of the nominal group serving as Subject agrees with the form of the verb serving as Finite of the verbal group serving as Finite + Predicator.

This misunderstanding arises from confusing ranks and again viewing the clause 'from below', how it is realised, instead of 'from above', what it means.

It will be seen in the following posts that this confusion of function and form across ranks as "syntagmatic dependency relations between functions" is a persistent source of confusion for Martin.

Misunderstanding A Taxonomy Of Forms As A System Of Functions

Martin (2013: 66):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this misunderstands a taxonomy of forms, word classes, as a word rank system of potential. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 52):

Misunderstanding System And Rank

Martin (2013: 63):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands system and rank. Realisation statements in a clause rank system specify clause rank structure, not the types of group rank units that realise clause rank functions.

Confusing Formal Constituency (Rank) With Function Structure

Martin (2013: 62):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, functions are not constituents of rank units, such as clause and nominal groups. Constituents of rank units are lower rank units on the rank scale. Constituents of clauses are groups and phrases.

The Thing is a function of a word, a constituent of a nominal group, and the structure of a rank unit is the relationships among the functions, not the functions themselves (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 451).

Rebranding Halliday's Work As Martin's

Martin (2013: 45-6):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this augmentation for devising the system network begins by taking the view 'from below': grammatical form and structure. 

The claim that the second perspective is 'discourse' semantic is misleading, because it rebrands Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's system. Martin has made a career out of rebranding other people's work as his own, as demonstrated here and here, for example, and has even won a prize for it (recorded here).

Confusing Function With Form

 Martin (2013: 40):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, features of systems, such as the MOOD system, are not classes. It is form, not function, that is categorised into classes; e.g. word classes, group classes.

Misunderstanding Redundancy And Structure

Martin (2013: 40):

Technically speaking, as noted above, a sequence of classes redounding with one another is referred to as a syntagm. Redounding functions are referred to as structures. … By 'redound' we mean that the classes of functions are redundant with respect to one another — in other words they are mutually expectant (given one class or function the co-appearance of another is not random). This is simply a more technical way to say that the classes form a syntagm or that the functions form a structure and so make a meaning beyond the sum of their parts.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the notion of redundancy. To be clear, 'redundancy' refers to the skewing of probabilities away from equiprobability. Halliday (2003 [1987]: 122):

In an ideal system, one having two states that are equiprobable, there is no redundancy. Once we depart from equiprobability, redundancy sets in. In all open systems the probabilities are skewed, so that the system carries redundancy.

In SFL Theory, 'redundancy' is used to refer to realisation relations between strata. Halliday (2002 [1992]: 356):

Consider a minimal semiotic system, such as a protolanguage – a system that is made up of simple signs. This is based on the principle of redundancy. When we say that contents p, q, r are “realised” respectively by expressions a, b, c, what this means is that there is a redundancy relation between them: given meaning p, we can predict sound or gesture a, and given sound or gesture a we can predict meaning p. This relationship is symmetrical; “redounds with” is equivalent both to “realises” and to “is realised by”.

with these probabilities variably skewed along the cline of instantiation. Halliday (2002 [1992]: 359):

The [language] system is permeable because each instance redounds with the context of situation, and so perturbs the system in interaction with the environment.

Halliday (2003 [1997]: 260):

If we consider register variation first: viewing from the "instance" end, we can recognise a text type as a collection of similar instances. But when we shift perspective and see it as systemic variation, each of these text types appears as a register, a kind of subsystem which redounds with the properties of the context in terms of field, tenor and mode.

Martin, however, misunderstands the skewed probabilities of redundancy as just any mutual expectancy, and applies this to the sequencing of items on the syntagmatic axis.

[2] As demonstrated above, redundancy is not a more technical way of saying that syntagms and structures "make a meaning beyond the sum of their parts". The crucial point that Martin omits is that, just as a system is the relationships among its features, a structure is the relationships among its functions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Misrepresenting Single Forms As Function Structures

Martin (2013: 28, 31):

… we have been dealing with pronoun systems realisation by single unit structures (by single words) above …

In the next chapter we'll move on to consider system networks realised by structures consisting of more than one element …

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is not true. Martin has not even been dealing with functional elements of structure, let alone structures. He has only been dealing with forms, pronouns, and devising networks by giving priority to form over function in doing so — the opposite approach to that taken in SFL Theory. To be clear, a structure is the relationships among functions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Comparing Tagalog And English Person & Number Systems

Martin (2013: 24-5):

Our system network formulation of the revised paradigm is presented below, with PERSON and NUMBER as simultaneous systems, but with a different set of oppositions than those we distinguished when working on the English systems. From this we can see that although English and Tagalog have comparable regions of meaning as far as their pronouns grammar is concerned, no pronoun in one of the two languages can ever be the exact equivalent of a pronoun in the other — because the valeur, to use Saussure's term, is different. The systems are comparable but not equivalent.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's revised paradigm is just Schachter & Otanes' paradigm with different labels:

Martin has replaced Schachter & Otanes' 'non-plural' and 'plural' with Schachter & Otanes' gloss of their own labels, and replaced their formal categories of person with Halliday's functional categories, as previously explained.

[2] This is misleading. Because Martin used formal categories for English and functional categories for Tagalog, the comparability of the meanings is obscured. For example, if English were presented in these functional terms, the only difference between the two would be the absence of the "speaker/addressee" feature in English.

Note that, from an SFL perspective, English does make a distinction in meaning between 'only' and '+others' for 'addressee', it is just that the same form you realises both feature combinations. The distinction in meaning is demonstrated, for example, by the dialectal use of youse and y'all as realisations for the '+others' meaning.

Misrepresenting A Formal Approach To Tagalog Pronoun Classification

Martin (2013: 23-4):

Tagalog makes a distinction between what is generally referred to as inclusive and exclusive 'we' — a distinction in other words between reference to the speaker and one or more others, including the addressee, and the speaker and one or more others, excluding the addressee. … Schachter & Otanes (1972) label the paradigm they propose as follows:

Their labelling raises two questions. The first issue is the choice of the label non-plural instead of singular; this is presumably because the pronoun kata, which refers to the speaker and one addressee, involves more than one person (so is not singular). The second concern is the label dual; this is a rather odd choice of term, since dual is usually used as part of a NUMBER system ([singular], [dual], [trial], [paucal], [plural] etc.) not a PERSON system; and in any case, the 'plural' inclusive pronoun tayo refers to more than two people (the speaker, addressee, and one or more others). But we can see the problem Schachter & Otanes have here: the categories they inherited from the Greco-Roman tradition don't fit — because Tagalog has four persons not three.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no need for Martin to presume this about the label 'non-plural' because Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88) are quite explicit about it:

The first group is called non-plural rather than singular because it included dual pronouns, meaning literally 'you (singular) and I'.

[2] To be clear, this misleads by ignoring the explanation given by the authors. Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88) explain the reasoning behind their number proportionalities as follows:

The plural pronouns have, as a group, the meanings of the corresponding non-plural pronouns with the additional meaning 'and others' (or 'and another'): thus the first-person plural is literally 'I and others', the dual plural 'you (singular) and I and others', etc.

Martin's purpose in ignoring the explanation given by the authors will be seen in the following post.

[3] This is misleading. An alternative Formal approach to classifying personal pronouns does "fit":

[4] This is misleading because it is not true. Tagalog has three persons, not four, since, as Martin himself acknowledges, 'dual' is a number category, not a person category.

Misrepesenting The 'General Disposition' Of Grammarians

Martin (2013: 23):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the treatment of you as an outsider and it as an exception reflects the disposition of Martin to misrepresent a systemic approach to formal grammar as a systemic approach to functional grammar. In the next section, on Tagalog pronouns, where he switches to functional features, he will falsely claim that this will be taking a discourse semantic approach, and so Martinian, rather than a grammatical approach, and so Hallidayan.

Classifying Forms (Personal Pronouns) In Terms Of Formal Categories (Case)

Martin (2013: 22-3):

As far as NUMBER and GENDER are concerned it is a regular part of the system; but as far as CASE is concerned it is an exception. The usual strategy for showing exceptions of this kind in SFL is to use a marking convention that blocks specific combinations of features. We can read the 'I' superscript on the feature [neuter] along these lines and connect it to the 'T' superscript on [nominative] (read as 'if [neuter] then [nominative]', and so not [accusative]). Note that this means arbitrarily describing it as [nominative], and lacking an accusative form. …  

CASE is introduced as a third system, simultaneous with NUMBER and GENDER below. The if/then marking convention has been deployed in the network, but realisations have been informally provided as a list, rather than being tied to specific features (except for you).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is again classifying form (a pronoun) in terms of formal categories (case) instead of systemising functions.

[2] Note that this means misrepresenting the data, since it is the accusative form as well as the nominative form. That is, it is a misuse of the conditional marking.

[3] To be clear, these are not functions, but forms specified by formal categories. Martin's motivation for modelling forms instead of functions will become clear in the review of his Tagalog PERSON systems.