The Methodological Aberration That Undermines This Entire Monograph

Martin (2013: 112):

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To be clear, this encapsulates the basic methodological problem in this monograph. Where SFL Theory gives priority to the view 'from above', Martin, while claiming the opposite, gives priority to the view 'from below', by devising systems to account for structures. It is this opposite, contra-functional methodology that naturally leads Martin to call for 'restoring more of a balance between the concerns of system and structure in SFL research' (p69).

Martin's central claim that axial relations underlie the other dimensions of language has been asserted repeatedly throughout the monograph without supporting argument. Moreover, as demonstrated throughout this review, Martin misunderstands axis as axial relations, and the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes, realisation, as the realisation statements in paradigmatic systems.

Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

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[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

Misconstruing The Material As Semiotic

Martin (2013: 104):

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[1] As throughout this monograph, contrā SFL methodology, Martin here again gives priority to the view 'from below' by developing networks to account for structures,

[2] To be clear, knowledge and action are merely rebrandings of the speech function commodities information and goods-&-services, respectively.

[3] To be clear, in linguistics, the term 'prospective' is used to describe Indicating grammatically that an activity about to begin. This is the opposite of not providing a verbal response. Martin has here mistaken a material order action for a semiotic order response.

"Foregrounding" Paradigmatic Relations

Martin (2013: 95):

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To be clear, in SFL Theory, priority is given to system over structure. Here Martin gives priority to structure over system by claiming that the purpose of paradigmatic relations is to account for structures, while simultaneously claiming the opposite: that this is "foregrounding" the paradigmatic.

What Martin Has Done In Chapter 5

Martin (2013: 93-4):

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[1] To be clear, 'bundles of interdependent features' are systems, and system is the means of modelling choice across the dimensions of language, such as metafunction, rank and stratification.

[2] To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar is grammatical metaphor, and two system-structure cycles are merely the consequence of the stratification.

[3] To be clear, in giving priority to 'structural generalisations', Martin is giving priority to the view 'from below', in contradistinction to the SFL methodology of giving priority to the view 'from above'.

[4] To be clear, the number of system-structure cycles on the content plane is not an issue in SFL Theory, since it follows as a direct consequence from Halliday's original stratification.

[5] To be clear, it is only Halliday's semantics that provides a systematic account of grammatical metaphor, not Martin's discourse semantics. This is why Martin has used Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION in his discussion. The reader is invited to try using the systems of IDEATION and CONJUNCTION in Martin (1992) to describe ideational metaphor, given that both are textual grammatical systems, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, relabelled as Martin's ideational discourse semantic systems, and as such, CONJUNCTION, for example, does not account for the logico-semantic relation of projection.

Giving Priority To Structure In Devising System

 Martin (2013: 93):

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[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The system of MODALITY represents the choices at clause rank. If one of these choices is realised metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of an Adjunct, it can be specified by a realisation statement attached to the feature in the network. Martin's misunderstanding here again derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', structure.

Moreover, in order to account for grammatical metaphor, it is necessary to provide both the congruent and metaphorical analyses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613-4):

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does.

[2] To be clear, the entry condition to clause complexing is the feature clause, and in this metaphor, modality is realised within a clause complex instead of within a clause.

Misunderstanding 'From Above' And Rebranding Speech Function As Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 82-3):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misunderstands looking 'from above' as looking 'above' — i.e. from below. Again, this is the direct opposite of SFL methodology. Instead of being concerned with how meaning is realised, Martin is concerned with what wording realises.

[2] Here Martin misleads by rebranding Halliday's semantic system of speech function as Martin's discourse semantic system, which Martin himself proposes.

The Problem Of Grouping Declarative With Imperative

Martin (2013: 77):

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[1] For the generalisation lost in Martin's network, see the previous post.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the grammar is interpreted as the realisation of meaning. So declarative is "grouped" with interrogative, not imperative, under the superordinate indicative, because these two types of indicative are the congruent realisation of propositions, in contradistinction to imperative, which is the congruent realisation of a proposal.

[3] To be clear, the structural realisation of TENSE is specified in a verbal group network, not a clause network.

[4] To be clear, the problem with the MOOD network in Halliday & Matthiessen is easily rectified by adding a superscript 'I' to the system INDICATIVE TYPE, and a superscript 'T' to the system COMMENT. Problems with Martin's networks are not so easily rectified, as this blog has demonstrated.

Prioritising The Perspective Of Tagging

Martin (2013: 75-6):

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To be clear, the perspective that Martin prioritises by making it criterial is the opposite perspective to that taken in the methodology of a functional grammar. That is, instead of organising a system on the basis of meaningful distinctions and then stipulating how these are realised structurally, Martin organises a system on the basis of the realisation: whether or not the meaningful choice is realised by a Mood Tag. Importantly, the central argument of this monograph rests on Martin, throughout, mistakenly giving priority to the view 'from below', while claiming the opposite.

The False Claim That The Architecture Of Language In SFL Is Founded On Axial Relations

Martin (2013: 75):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the examination of Chapter 4 demonstrated Martin's false claim that metafunction and rank are based on axis derives from his misunderstanding of axis and other factors, such as giving priority to the view 'from below' in devising systems, in contradistinction to SFL methodology.

[2] In this chapter, it will be seen that stratification, also, is not founded on axial relations. Consequently, the organisation of system networks in SFL, and its conception of the architecture of language, are not either, since these, too, are falsehoods deriving from the same misunderstandings.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, systems are not motivated by structure. This would be taking the perspective 'from below' (what systems do these structures realise?). In SFL Theory, the perspective taken is the opposite: 'from above' (how are these systems realised in structure?). This whole monograph is based on this misunderstanding (and the misunderstanding of axis).

Martin's Criticism Of Matthiessen's Network

Martin (2013: 73):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here, yet again, Martin adopts the opposite perspective to SFL Theory by giving priority to structure over system.  A grammatical system is devised on the basis of the meaning being realised, not the structures that realise it.

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, Matthiessen's network properly restricts recursion to just those features that can be realised iteratively. Matthiessen (1995: 232):

Martin's clause network, in contrast, allows potentially unlimited insertions of Medium and Process, and potentially unlimited selections of both 'middle' and 'effective' if the feature 'agentive' is selected. So it is Martin's network that does not account for the structures he has presented.

[3] Matthiessen's network only presents recursion in effective clauses because that was the extent of its description. As Matthiessen (ibid.) made clear:

The system network in Figure 4-14 sets out a partial specification of options and their realisations.

It is misleading of Martin to claim that Matthiessen restricts agency to effective clause, because the network is immediately preceded by instances of agency, all of which are middle clauses. Matthiessen (ibid.):

For instance:

The general kept the soldiers marching.
The general helped the soldiers march.
The general required the soldiers to march.
Well they got the army digging

∞

In summary, Martin here misleads the reader by deliberately misrepresenting Matthiessen's network, and promoting his own very poorly constructed network as successful in comparison.

"Systems Tied To Structures"

 Martin (2013: 73):

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To be clear, the notion of 'systems tied to structures' gives priority to structure, which is the opposite perspective to that taken in SFL Theory. The latter perspective gives priority to systems whose realisation statements provide structural specifications. Throughout this entire monograph, Martin has misunderstood realisation statements as axial relations, and axial relations as axis.

Advocating A More Structural-Formal Approach To Systemic-Functional Grammar

Martin (2013: 69):

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To be clear, as previous posts have demonstrated, this conclusion derives from privileging structure in devising systems, contrary to SFL methodology, and from confusing functions at clause rank with forms at lower ranks. It is thus an ill-conceived call for a systemic-structural functional-formal grammar to replace Systemic Functional Grammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning – it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself.

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organizing principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness …

It is because SFL gives priority to the higher level of abstraction (system and function), rather than the lower level of abstraction (structure and form), that its use for computerised parsing is more difficult. But the limitations of computers are no basis for making a theory less functional.

Martin's call for "restoring more of a balance" might be seen as an instance of the logical fallacy:

Argument to moderation (Latin: argumentum ad temperantiam) — also known as the false compromise, argument from middle ground, fallacy of grey, middle ground fallacy, or golden mean fallacy — is the fallacy that the truth is always in the middle of two opposites. It does not necessarily suggest that an argument for the middle solution or for a compromise is always fallacious, but rather applies primarily in cases where such a position is ill-informed, unfeasible, or impossible, or where an argument is incorrectly made that a position is correct simply because it is in the middle.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [2]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

[2] To be clear, it is not that these word rank markers of Subject and Finite — i.e. the view 'from below — constitute recognition criteria for Subject and Finite, but that the clause rank elements reprised in the Mood Tag identify the Subject and Finite of the clause.

[3] To be clear, in the system of MOOD, the realisation statement Subject^Finite for the feature informative "refers back" to the realisation statement +Subject for the feature indicative.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [1]

Martin (2013: 66-7):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the basic descriptive challenge alluded to here is said to arise from Martin's self-contradiction of privileging system by using structure to motivate systems.

However, this is misleading, because privileging system poses no challenge for describing clause rank systems, since these phenomena are word rank markers of clause rank functions. It is not that the Subject agrees with the verb, but the form of the word serving as the Head of the nominal group serving as Subject agrees with the form of the verb serving as Finite of the verbal group serving as Finite + Predicator.

This misunderstanding arises from confusing ranks and again viewing the clause 'from below', how it is realised, instead of 'from above', what it means.

It will be seen in the following posts that this confusion of function and form across ranks as "syntagmatic dependency relations between functions" is a persistent source of confusion for Martin.

Privileging Structure While Claiming The Opposite

Martin (2013: 66):

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This is self-contradiction. Using structure to motivate systems is privileging structure, not system, and this is the direct opposite of SFL methodology.

Deriving System From Structure

Martin (2013: 63):

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To be clear, this once again misrepresents SFL methodology by devising a system from below: on the basis of structure.

Misrepresenting SFL Methodology And Nominal Group Potential

Martin (2013: 61):

Blogger Comments:

Firstly, this once again misrepresents SFL methodology by devising a system from below: on the basis of structure.

Secondly, not all nominal groups include a Thing function. For example, neither nominal group in the clause that was nice includes a Thing: the first has Deictic as Head, and the second has Epithet as Head. Martin does not account for this in any later discussion.

Thirdly, the choice of 'simple' vs 'complex' as a nominal group system is very poor pedagogically, not to say theoretically, since the notion of a simple nominal group and a complex nominal group invites confusion with a nominal group simplex and a nominal group complex. 

Misunderstanding Delicacy And Prioritising Structure

Martin (2013: 56):

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To be clear, on the one hand, this misunderstands delicacy as "privileging". Delicacy is simply a hyponymic relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145), and a hypernym (e.g. ape) is not more "privileged" than any of its hyponyms (e.g. human). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 14):

the paradigmatic network is ordered in delicacy (subsumption, classification, specialisation), from the least delicate (most general) to the most delicate (most specific types).

On the other hand, this, once again, misrepresents SFL methodology by taking the view 'from below', structural similarity, in determining how to organise a system.

Misrepresenting The Tagging Of Negative Clauses

Martin (2013: 55-6):

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This is misleading, because it is simply not true that negative clauses always reverse their polarity in the Tag, as demonstrated by instances like They won't pay, won't they?. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 173-4) provide the view 'from above':