Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

Misunderstanding Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Martin (2013: 97):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, each lexical item is the synthetic realisation of a set of the most delicate grammatical features, as in Hasan's approach, not the realisation of a single grammatical feature, as in Martin's approach. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):

Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations.

An analogy can be found in phonology. For example, the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the set of features [voiced, bilabial stop], not the realisation of a single articulatory feature.

The Big Lie Of Chapter 5

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This very misleading indeed. Martin has spent the bulk of Chapter 5 arguing that, because of grammatical metaphor, SFL needs two system-structure cycles, as if this were his idea and his argument. See also 

• Falsely Claiming That The Content Plane Was Not Stratified Before Martin (1992).
• On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

Martin furthers this false impression by falsely claiming that Halliday & Matthiessen propose a single system-structure cycle on the content plane for MODALITY, by making a false claim about their lexicogrammatical system, without considering their semantic system.

Martin makes these misleading claims to argue for his own discourse semantic systems, despite the fact that his discourse semantic stratum does not include a system of MODALITY, and he does not provide one here to demonstrate its relation to the lexicogrammatical system.

[2] To be clear, Martin's stratified social systems are his misunderstanding of linguistic registers and genres as the cultural context realised by linguistic systems.

Falsely Finding Fault In The Mood Network Of Halliday & Matthiessen

Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is not true. The feature [explicit] can be selected, and it can be realised: metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of congruently as a modal Adjunct; see previous post. There is thus no need to remove the feature [explicit] from the network.

The Motivation For Speech Function vs Mood

Martin (2013: 83, 84):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the entire content plane into semantic and lexicogrammatical systems is grammatical metaphor. So in the case of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION and grammatical system of MOOD, interpersonal metaphors of mood motivate their stratification. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

Misunderstanding 'From Above' And Rebranding Speech Function As Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 82-3):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misunderstands looking 'from above' as looking 'above' — i.e. from below. Again, this is the direct opposite of SFL methodology. Instead of being concerned with how meaning is realised, Martin is concerned with what wording realises.

[2] Here Martin misleads by rebranding Halliday's semantic system of speech function as Martin's discourse semantic system, which Martin himself proposes.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [2]

Martin (2013: 81):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

Misrepresenting Interpersonal Metaphor Of Mood

Martin (2013: 80-1):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'stratal tension between discourse function and MOOD' is the incongruent (metaphorical) realisation of SPEECH FUNCTION in MOOD. 

[2] To be clear, the metaphorical realisations do not "dress themselves up lexicogrammatically as commands". Lexicogrammatically, they are just like any other indicative clauses. The difference is semantic, not lexicogrammatical, since they realise proposals (demanding goods-&-services) rather than propositions (giving or demanding information) in terms of SPEECH FUNCTION.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [1]

Martin (2013: 80):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misleads by misrepresenting Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantics.

[2] To be clear, grammatical structure realises (not "reflects") choices made in the MOOD system.

[3] To be clear, 'congruent' is Halliday's technical term for the agreement between semantics and grammar.

[4] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

The Problem Of Grouping Declarative With Imperative

Martin (2013: 77):

Blogger Comments:

[1] For the generalisation lost in Martin's network, see the previous post.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the grammar is interpreted as the realisation of meaning. So declarative is "grouped" with interrogative, not imperative, under the superordinate indicative, because these two types of indicative are the congruent realisation of propositions, in contradistinction to imperative, which is the congruent realisation of a proposal.

[3] To be clear, the structural realisation of TENSE is specified in a verbal group network, not a clause network.

[4] To be clear, the problem with the MOOD network in Halliday & Matthiessen is easily rectified by adding a superscript 'I' to the system INDICATIVE TYPE, and a superscript 'T' to the system COMMENT. Problems with Martin's networks are not so easily rectified, as this blog has demonstrated.

Prioritising The Perspective Of Tagging

Martin (2013: 75-6):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the perspective that Martin prioritises by making it criterial is the opposite perspective to that taken in the methodology of a functional grammar. That is, instead of organising a system on the basis of meaningful distinctions and then stipulating how these are realised structurally, Martin organises a system on the basis of the realisation: whether or not the meaningful choice is realised by a Mood Tag. Importantly, the central argument of this monograph rests on Martin, throughout, mistakenly giving priority to the view 'from below', while claiming the opposite.

Confusing Systems Across Ranks

Martin (2013: 68-9):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these "inter-function dependencies" are inter-system relations at ranks below the clause. That is, this confuses clause rank functions, Subject, Finite, Complement, with the realisation of features of systems at lower rank, NUMBER, GENDER, CASE.

[2] To be clear, 'prosodic' is a type of structure, and a structure is the relationships that obtain between functions (elements) at given rank. It does not refer to a syntagm of forms, such as words or morphemes.

[3] To be clear, 'to follow Halliday's lead' is the default procedure, unless there are valid reasons for doing otherwise, because SFL Theory is his brainchild, and no-one else's. But the system of PERSON in the MOOD network is not concerned with the lower rank realisations that Martin confuses with clause rank here. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [4]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, since these are word rank forms marking different reference items. The 'reflexive' form marks an anaphoric reference to the Theme/Subject, whereas the other form does not.

To be clear, the same system "introduces" the Subject, Complement and Adjunct. That is, the MOOD system includes realisation statements that insert these functions in clause structure.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [3]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank. The 'agreement' here is between word rank forms realising group rank functions, not between clause rank functions.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [2]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

[2] To be clear, it is not that these word rank markers of Subject and Finite — i.e. the view 'from below — constitute recognition criteria for Subject and Finite, but that the clause rank elements reprised in the Mood Tag identify the Subject and Finite of the clause.

[3] To be clear, in the system of MOOD, the realisation statement Subject^Finite for the feature informative "refers back" to the realisation statement +Subject for the feature indicative.

Misunderstanding Delicacy And Prioritising Structure

Martin (2013: 56):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, on the one hand, this misunderstands delicacy as "privileging". Delicacy is simply a hyponymic relation (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145), and a hypernym (e.g. ape) is not more "privileged" than any of its hyponyms (e.g. human). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 14):

the paradigmatic network is ordered in delicacy (subsumption, classification, specialisation), from the least delicate (most general) to the most delicate (most specific types).

On the other hand, this, once again, misrepresents SFL methodology by taking the view 'from below', structural similarity, in determining how to organise a system.

Misrepresenting Polarity And Tag Potential

Martin (2013: 56-7):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, because of the unwarranted conditional marking, this network fails to account for either negative Mood Tags in negative clauses, such as So, he won't pay, won't he?, and negative exclamatives, such as How tidy you are…not!.

[2] To be clear, a realisation statement specifies the structural consequences of a systemic feature at the rank in question. If the feature 'tagged' is selected, the structural consequence is simply + Finite^Subject. Nominal and verbal group variation is accounted for at group rank, and is irrelevant to structure at clause rank.

Misrepresenting The Tagging Of Negative Clauses

Martin (2013: 55-6):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is simply not true that negative clauses always reverse their polarity in the Tag, as demonstrated by instances like They won't pay, won't they?. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 173-4) provide the view 'from above':

Summary Of Exclamatives And Negative Imperatives

Martin (2013: 55):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, a proscription against negative exclamative clauses fails to account for instances like What a good boy you are…not!

[2] To be clear, the discussion of negative imperatives misrepresented Finite not as a Mood Adjunct.

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 165-6) for the full paradigm of negative imperatives:

Mistaking Part Of The Finite For A Mood Adjunct [2]

Martin (2013: 54):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this again misunderstands not as a Mood Adjunct instead of part of the Finite do not. Again, here not is simply a formal or written variant of n't. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 175):

Finally, we should note that the negative word not occurs in two functions: either it is simply a formal or written variant of the Finite negative element n’t, in which case it is part of the Finite; or it is a distinct modal Adjunct in Mood or Residue. In the latter case it is phonologically salient and may also be tonic

A genuine example of not as a Mood Adjunct is

After all that, I couldn't not go, could I?