Genre Staging And Phasing Lower Stratum Context Selections In The Instantiation Of Language

Martin (2013: 111):

Blogger Comments:

For some of the theoretical problems with the model of genre in Martin (1992), see the 69 posts here.

To be clear, Martin (1992) models genre as a (non-metafunctional) stratum of context, located above the systems of field, tenor and mode, which he misunderstands as systems of register. As a consequence, genres (narratives etc.) are modelled as realised by field, tenor and mode features, such as those characterising the relative social status and contact of the speaker/writer and the addressee.

To be clear, even in Martin's model, genre cannot be "a resource for staging field, tenor and mode selections in unfolding discourse" because unfolding discourse is the instantiation of language systems in logogenesis, whereas genre and field, tenor and mode are systems of different strata at the level of context, and are thus not instantiated in language.

Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

Misunderstanding Interstratal Realisation

Martin (2013: 98-9):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this misunderstands realisation. Realisation is the same whether it is intra-stratal, inter-stratal, or inter-axial. Realisation is an intensive identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction, such that the lower level realises the higher level, which entails that the higher level is realised by the lower level. The standard convention is to state the relation in terms of the higher level, for which the standard symbol is a 'south-east' arrow ↘.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

At the same time, this stratal organisation means that it is crucial to specify the realisational relations between strata — inter-stratal realisation. In systemic theory, this relationship is stated in terms of the organisation of the higher stratum — for a simple reason: a higher stratum provides a more comprehensive environment than a lower one… . More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/ graphological system.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [2]

Martin (2013: 81):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

Misrepresenting Interpersonal Metaphor Of Mood

Martin (2013: 80-1):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'stratal tension between discourse function and MOOD' is the incongruent (metaphorical) realisation of SPEECH FUNCTION in MOOD. 

[2] To be clear, the metaphorical realisations do not "dress themselves up lexicogrammatically as commands". Lexicogrammatically, they are just like any other indicative clauses. The difference is semantic, not lexicogrammatical, since they realise proposals (demanding goods-&-services) rather than propositions (giving or demanding information) in terms of SPEECH FUNCTION.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [1]

Martin (2013: 80):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misleads by misrepresenting Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantics.

[2] To be clear, grammatical structure realises (not "reflects") choices made in the MOOD system.

[3] To be clear, 'congruent' is Halliday's technical term for the agreement between semantics and grammar.

[4] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

Misunderstanding The Trinocular Perspective On Strata

Martin (2013: 77-8):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, viewing a nominal group 'from above', stratally, means viewing the grammar from above: seeing the grammatical unit as the realisation of meaning; for example, as the congruent realisation of a participant element, or as the metaphorical realisation of a figure or sequence.

Importantly, it is not the nominal group that is 'evaluated' and 'tracked in the text' but the meaning that it realises. So these are not viewing the grammar from above, but instead just viewing the stratum above: semantics.

Similarly, viewing 'from below' stratally means viewing the grammar from below: as wording that is realised phonologically or graphologically. Again, it is not the nominal group that has rhythmic structure, but the prosodic phonology that realises it, and not the nominal group that is spelt with an initial upper case, but the graphology that realises it. So this is not viewing the grammar 'from below' but instead viewing the stratum below: phonology or graphology.

In short, Martin misconstrues viewing 'from above' as viewing 'above', and viewing 'from below' as viewing 'below'.

Misunderstanding The Trinocular Perspective

 Martin (2013: 77):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands the trinocular perspective, since the trinocular perspective is concerned with levels of symbolic abstraction, whereas rank is a composition hierarchy, not a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction. That is, clauses are composed of groups, not realised by them; groups are composed of words, not realised by them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) explain:

A stratified semiotic defines three perspectives, which (following the most familiar metaphor) we refer to as 'from above', 'from roundabout', and 'from below': looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content, looking at it from below means treating it as the content of some expression, while looking at it from roundabout means treating it in the context of (i.e. in relation to other features of) its own stratum.

Misunderstanding System And Rank

Martin (2013: 63):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands system and rank. Realisation statements in a clause rank system specify clause rank structure, not the types of group rank units that realise clause rank functions.

Distinguishing Mood By Structural Realisation Instead Of The Meaning It Realises

Martin (2013: 43):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Here he also explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

And again, the inclusion of the verbal group feature 'non-finite' in this clause system confuses ranks, and misrepresents imperative clauses, which can include Finite and Subject elements, as non-finite.

Misrepresenting The Finiteness Of Imperative Clauses

Martin (2013: 42-3):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Here Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'.

A further theoretical inconsistency is the inclusion of the verbal group feature 'non-finite' in this clause system. As well as confusing ranks, imperative clauses are finite clauses and can include Finite and Subject elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 165):

In the analysis, the unmarked positive has no Mood element, it consists of Residue (Predicator): the verb form (e.g. look) is Predicator only, with no Finite in it. The other forms have a Mood element; this consists of Subject only (you), Finite only (do, don’t), or Finite followed by Subject (don’t you). Any of these can be followed by a Mood tag: won’t you?, will you? – showing that the clause is finite, even though the verb is non-finite (the imperative of be is be, as in Be quiet!, not the finite form are.

Giving Priority To Form Over Function

Martin (2013: 22):

As a final step we can consider adding CASE to the system, and so distinguish between pronouns which reference the nub of the argument (grammatically the Subject of a clause) and those which don't (grammatically the Complement of a clause or prepositional phrase, or the 'subject' of a non-finite clause) — cf. She noticed him texting me for them.

I, she, he, it, you, we, they

me, him, her, us them

Fortunately you remains the odd one out, since it doesn't distinguish either NUMBER or CASE. That effectively leaves us with the problem of it, which is [singular] and [neuter], as we saw above. As far as NUMBER and GENDER are concerned it is a regular part of the system; but as far as CASE is concerned it is an exception.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'case' is a formal category, not a functional one, so it is misleading to present it as a system in a work purporting to be 'a next step' into Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] To be clear, distinguishing between pronouns is distinguishing between forms, not functions, so it is misleading to present them as features in a system in a work purporting to be 'a next step' into Systemic Functional Grammar.

[3] This is misleading. Pronouns don't reference the Subject; the nominal group in which a pronoun figures realises the Subject. Such a pronoun references an entity elsewhere — either (endophorically) in the text, or (exophorically) in the environment of a text.

[4] This is misleading because it uses the opposite methodology to that of Systemic Functional Grammar. That is, it gives priority to the view 'from below', form, instead of the view 'from above', function.

Giving Priority To The View 'From Below' [2]

Martin (2013: 20):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this network is misleading in that it misrepresents the approach of SFL Theory. To be clear:

1. the realisations of these features are not structures, or even functions, but grammatical form (pronouns),
2. the features 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, and
3. the network gives priority to the view 'from below' instead of 'from above', since it is using form to derive systems.

On this last point, the method of SFL Theory is to identify how meanings are expressed, but Martin's method is to identify what expressions mean.

Cf. Matthiessen (1995: 390):

Giving Priority To The View 'From Below' [1]

Martin (2013: 19-20):

Blogger Comments:

This network is misleading in that it misrepresents the approach of SFL Theory. To be clear:

1. the realisations of these features are not structures, or even functions, but grammatical form (pronouns),
2. the features 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, and
3. the network gives priority to the view 'from below' instead of 'from above', since it is using form to derive systems.

On this last point, the method of SFL Theory is to identify how meanings are expressed, but Martin's method is to identify what expressions mean.

Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 62):

… there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2):

This intersects with a system of NUMBER, opposing ‘one’ to ‘more than one’ (see Figure 2-3).

The way these two combine varies among different languages; for the version found in (modern standard) English, see Table 2-1 and, for further detail, Chapter 6.

Misunderstanding What Saussure Was "Struggling Against"

Martin (2013: 2):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the conception that Saussure was "struggling against" is that sign unites a thing and a name. Saussure is quite explicit that a linguistic sign is a psychological entity with two levels of abstraction: concept and sound-image. Saussure (1959: 66):

The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it "material," it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract.

The psychological character of our sound-images becomes apparent when we observe our own speech. Without moving our lips or tongue, we can talk to ourselves or recite mentally a selection of verse. …

The linguistic sign is then a two-sided psychological entity that can be represented by the drawing:

The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other.

From the perspective of SFL Theory, these two levels of abstraction are semantics and the phonological expression of lexicogrammar, and the relation between levels of abstraction, Value and Token, is realisation, which is symbolised by a single-headed arrow ↘.

Having introduced these two levels of abstraction, Saussure makes the relation between them explicit by labelling them signified (signifié) and signifier (signifiant). Saussure (1959: 67, 114):

Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here were designated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the others. I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier [signifiant] ; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts.

[2] To be clear, Saussure is quite explicit about his reason for not using the word 'symbol' for the signifier. Saussure (1959: 68):

The word symbol has been used to designate the linguistic sign, or more specifically, what is here called the signifier. Principle I [the arbitrary nature of the sign] in particular weighs against the use of this term. One characteristic of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a chariot.