Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

Rebranding A Misunderstanding Of Speech Function As Negotiation

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin's system of NEGOTIATION:

is merely Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION (IFG4: 136):

with

• information rebranded as knowledge
• goods-&-services rebranded as action
• giving and demanding omitted
• the inclusion of a material-order response
• the inclusion of material-order interlocutors.

Confusing Meaners With Meaning Potential

Martin (2013: 105-6):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this again confuses the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) — including even their non-verbal behaviour — with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Confusing Meaners With Meaning

 Martin (2013: 104-5):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, knowers and actors are not language, and so do not constitute semiotic options in an exchange. Again, Martin has confused the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Confusing Orders Of Experience

Martin (2013: 104):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, handing over goods or providing a service is not language, and so does not constitute a semiotic exchange. Again, Martin has confused the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

The Big Lie Of Chapter 5

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This very misleading indeed. Martin has spent the bulk of Chapter 5 arguing that, because of grammatical metaphor, SFL needs two system-structure cycles, as if this were his idea and his argument. See also 

• Falsely Claiming That The Content Plane Was Not Stratified Before Martin (1992).
• On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

Martin furthers this false impression by falsely claiming that Halliday & Matthiessen propose a single system-structure cycle on the content plane for MODALITY, by making a false claim about their lexicogrammatical system, without considering their semantic system.

Martin makes these misleading claims to argue for his own discourse semantic systems, despite the fact that his discourse semantic stratum does not include a system of MODALITY, and he does not provide one here to demonstrate its relation to the lexicogrammatical system.

[2] To be clear, Martin's stratified social systems are his misunderstanding of linguistic registers and genres as the cultural context realised by linguistic systems.

The Motivation For Speech Function vs Mood

Martin (2013: 83, 84):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the entire content plane into semantic and lexicogrammatical systems is grammatical metaphor. So in the case of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION and grammatical system of MOOD, interpersonal metaphors of mood motivate their stratification. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

Misunderstanding 'From Above' And Rebranding Speech Function As Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 82-3):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misunderstands looking 'from above' as looking 'above' — i.e. from below. Again, this is the direct opposite of SFL methodology. Instead of being concerned with how meaning is realised, Martin is concerned with what wording realises.

[2] Here Martin misleads by rebranding Halliday's semantic system of speech function as Martin's discourse semantic system, which Martin himself proposes.

Misrepresenting Interpersonal Metaphor Of Mood

Martin (2013: 80-1):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'stratal tension between discourse function and MOOD' is the incongruent (metaphorical) realisation of SPEECH FUNCTION in MOOD. 

[2] To be clear, the metaphorical realisations do not "dress themselves up lexicogrammatically as commands". Lexicogrammatically, they are just like any other indicative clauses. The difference is semantic, not lexicogrammatical, since they realise proposals (demanding goods-&-services) rather than propositions (giving or demanding information) in terms of SPEECH FUNCTION.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [1]

Martin (2013: 80):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misleads by misrepresenting Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantics.

[2] To be clear, grammatical structure realises (not "reflects") choices made in the MOOD system.

[3] To be clear, 'congruent' is Halliday's technical term for the agreement between semantics and grammar.

[4] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Speech Function As Martin's Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 78-9):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, speech function is Halliday's system of interpersonal semantics. Here Martin misleads the reader by misrepresenting speech function as a system of his model of discourse semantics.

Looking Up To Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 78):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misconstrues looking 'from above' as looking 'above' ("up"), and misleads by using this misinterpretation to claim that it is important to look at his discourse semantics, since it may be a rich source of interpreting grammatical structure.

[2] This misunderstands the significance of Halliday's observation of the natural relation between grammatical form and meaning — a relation which is not accommodated by Martin's discourse semantics. Halliday (1985: xvii, xviii, xix):

The relation between the meaning and the wording is not, however, an arbitrary one: the form of the grammar relates naturally to the meanings that are being encoded. A functional grammar is designed to bring this out; it is a study of wording, but one that interprets the wording by reference to what it means. …

What this means is that both the general kinds of grammatical pattern that have evolved in language, and the specific manifestations of each kind, bear a natural relation to the meanings they have evolved to express. … the distinction into word classes of verb and noun reflects the analysis of experience into goings-on, expressed as verbs, and participants in the goings-on, expressed as nouns; and so on. …

… the relation of grammar to semantics is in this sense natural, not arbitrary …

Misunderstanding The Trinocular Perspective On Strata

Martin (2013: 77-8):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, viewing a nominal group 'from above', stratally, means viewing the grammar from above: seeing the grammatical unit as the realisation of meaning; for example, as the congruent realisation of a participant element, or as the metaphorical realisation of a figure or sequence.

Importantly, it is not the nominal group that is 'evaluated' and 'tracked in the text' but the meaning that it realises. So these are not viewing the grammar from above, but instead just viewing the stratum above: semantics.

Similarly, viewing 'from below' stratally means viewing the grammar from below: as wording that is realised phonologically or graphologically. Again, it is not the nominal group that has rhythmic structure, but the prosodic phonology that realises it, and not the nominal group that is spelt with an initial upper case, but the graphology that realises it. So this is not viewing the grammar 'from below' but instead viewing the stratum below: phonology or graphology.

In short, Martin misconstrues viewing 'from above' as viewing 'above', and viewing 'from below' as viewing 'below'.

Rebranding Halliday's Work As Martin's

Martin (2013: 45-6):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this augmentation for devising the system network begins by taking the view 'from below': grammatical form and structure. 

The claim that the second perspective is 'discourse' semantic is misleading, because it rebrands Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's system. Martin has made a career out of rebranding other people's work as his own, as demonstrated here and here, for example, and has even won a prize for it (recorded here).

Misrepresenting Others' Work As Martin's Invention

Martin (2013: 24-5):

We've adjusted the labelling for the paradigm below, to better capture the proportionalities involved. Instead of using traditional PERSON and NUMBER labels we've turned to discourse semantics, and chosen more transparent terms to capture what is going on. One problem with this for some linguists is that our labels now sound more contextual than grammatical, and formal grammarians might object to them on such grounds; and they are perhaps less familiar to linguists than the traditional ones, and so outsiders might find them harder to understand. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because discourse semantics is Martin's model, and so claiming to be drawing on discourse semantics here is claiming that this labelling is Martin's work, whereas the truth is that it is not. On the one hand, the PERSON categories are from Halliday's lexicogrammar, not Martin's discourse semantics. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 40, 41):

… there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2). …

On the other hand, the NUMBER categories are derived from Martin's source, Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88), not Martin's discourse semantics:

The plural pronouns have, as a group, the meanings of the corresponding non-plural pronouns with the additional meaning 'and others' (or 'and another'): thus the first-person plural is literally 'I and others', the dual plural 'you (singular) and I and others', etc.

[2] To be clear, the claim here is that a problem with more transparent terms is that they might be harder to understand.

[3] Trivially, in SFL Theory, 'context' is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, and formal grammarians do not use 'context' in this sense, so the labels that Martin has falsely claimed to be his own would not look more 'contextual' to them, and so would not be their grounds for objecting to them.