Martin (2013: 67):
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Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, since these are word rank forms marking different reference items. The 'reflexive' form marks an anaphoric reference to the Theme/Subject, whereas the other form does not.
To be clear, the same system "introduces" the Subject, Complement and Adjunct. That is, the MOOD system includes realisation statements that insert these functions in clause structure.
Martin (2013: 67):
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[1] Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.
[2] To be clear, it is not that these word rank markers of Subject and Finite — i.e. the view 'from below — constitute recognition criteria for Subject and Finite, but that the clause rank elements reprised in the Mood Tag identify the Subject and Finite of the clause.
[3] To be clear, in the system of MOOD, the realisation statement Subject^Finite for the feature informative "refers back" to the realisation statement +Subject for the feature indicative.
… we have been dealing with pronoun systems realisation by single unit structures (by single words) above …
In the next chapter we'll move on to consider system networks realised by structures consisting of more than one element …
Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.
Our system network formulation of the revised paradigm is presented below, with PERSON and NUMBER as simultaneous systems, but with a different set of oppositions than those we distinguished when working on the English systems. From this we can see that although English and Tagalog have comparable regions of meaning as far as their pronouns grammar is concerned, no pronoun in one of the two languages can ever be the exact equivalent of a pronoun in the other — because the valeur, to use Saussure's term, is different. The systems are comparable but not equivalent.
We've adjusted the labelling for the paradigm below, to better capture the proportionalities involved. Instead of using traditional PERSON and NUMBER labels we've turned to discourse semantics, and chosen more transparent terms to capture what is going on. One problem with this for some linguists is that our labels now sound more contextual than grammatical, and formal grammarians might object to them on such grounds; and they are perhaps less familiar to linguists than the traditional ones, and so outsiders might find them harder to understand. …
… there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2). …
On the other hand, the NUMBER categories are derived from Martin's source, Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88), not Martin's discourse semantics:
The plural pronouns have, as a group, the meanings of the corresponding non-plural pronouns with the additional meaning 'and others' (or 'and another'): thus the first-person plural is literally 'I and others', the dual plural 'you (singular) and I and others', etc.
[2] To be clear, the claim here is that a problem with more transparent terms is that they might be harder to understand.
[3] Trivially, in SFL Theory, 'context' is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, and formal grammarians do not use 'context' in this sense, so the labels that Martin has falsely claimed to be his own would not look more 'contextual' to them, and so would not be their grounds for objecting to them.
Tagalog makes a distinction between what is generally referred to as inclusive and exclusive 'we' — a distinction in other words between reference to the speaker and one or more others, including the addressee, and the speaker and one or more others, excluding the addressee. … Schachter & Otanes (1972) label the paradigm they propose as follows:
Their labelling raises two questions. The first issue is the choice of the label non-plural instead of singular; this is presumably because the pronoun kata, which refers to the speaker and one addressee, involves more than one person (so is not singular). The second concern is the label dual; this is a rather odd choice of term, since dual is usually used as part of a NUMBER system ([singular], [dual], [trial], [paucal], [plural] etc.) not a PERSON system; and in any case, the 'plural' inclusive pronoun tayo refers to more than two people (the speaker, addressee, and one or more others). But we can see the problem Schachter & Otanes have here: the categories they inherited from the Greco-Roman tradition don't fit — because Tagalog has four persons not three.
The first group is called non-plural rather than singular because it included dual pronouns, meaning literally 'you (singular) and I'.
[2] To be clear, this misleads by ignoring the explanation given by the authors. Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88) explain the reasoning behind their number proportionalities as follows:
The plural pronouns have, as a group, the meanings of the corresponding non-plural pronouns with the additional meaning 'and others' (or 'and another'): thus the first-person plural is literally 'I and others', the dual plural 'you (singular) and I and others', etc.
Martin's purpose in ignoring the explanation given by the authors will be seen in the following post.
[4] This is misleading because it is not true. Tagalog has three persons, not four, since, as Martin himself acknowledges, 'dual' is a number category, not a person category.
Martin (2013: 23):
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As far as NUMBER and GENDER are concerned it is a regular part of the system; but as far as CASE is concerned it is an exception. The usual strategy for showing exceptions of this kind in SFL is to use a marking convention that blocks specific combinations of features. We can read the 'I' superscript on the feature [neuter] along these lines and connect it to the 'T' superscript on [nominative] (read as 'if [neuter] then [nominative]', and so not [accusative]). Note that this means arbitrarily describing it as [nominative], and lacking an accusative form. …
CASE is introduced as a third system, simultaneous with NUMBER and GENDER below. The if/then marking convention has been deployed in the network, but realisations have been informally provided as a list, rather than being tied to specific features (except for you).
Martin (2013: 22):
As a final step we can consider adding CASE to the system, and so distinguish between pronouns which reference the nub of the argument (grammatically the Subject of a clause) and those which don't (grammatically the Complement of a clause or prepositional phrase, or the 'subject' of a non-finite clause) — cf. She noticed him texting me for them.
I, she, he, it, you, we, they
me, him, her, us them
Fortunately you remains the odd one out, since it doesn't distinguish either NUMBER or CASE. That effectively leaves us with the problem of it, which is [singular] and [neuter], as we saw above. As far as NUMBER and GENDER are concerned it is a regular part of the system; but as far as CASE is concerned it is an exception.
Martin (2013: 21-2):
Once thou was lost, English speakers would have had to deploy alternative resources to negotiate their social relations. And this means that we need to revise our pronoun network for standard English, as outlined below (setting aside GENDER for the moment to simplify the presentation).
It might be objected that we should keep the same system we developed for Shakespeare's times, and simply allow you to realise both second person singular and plural; this is the grammarian's concept of neutralisation. But we're going to be very stringent in our introduction to axial relations here and argue that if there is no difference in structure then there is no difference in system. Accordingly, we oppose above first and third person pronouns that distinguish NUMBER to second person pronouns which don't. This illustrates a very important strategy for network drawing — namely, setting aside, as early in delicacy as possible, classes that in some sense lie outside the system. Since you is different from other pronouns, we set it aside, and then move on to capture the parameters that the rest of the system shares.
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[3] To be clear, this is the methodology of SFL Theory, where priority is given to system and function over structure and form. Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 62):
[4] To be clear, the relation between the axes is simply realisation.
[6] This is misleading. To be clear, this is again giving priority to form (pronouns, classes) over function, the exact opposite of SFL methodology.
The personal pronoun represents the world according to the speaker, in the context of a speech exchange. The basic distinction is into speech roles (I, you) and other roles (he, she, it, they); there is also the generalised pronoun (one). These categories are set out in Figure 6-4.
The realisation of this system in structure has also been specified, with the words I, thou and he following the downward slanting arrow angled from upper left to lower right (the arrow represents 'is realised by'). In this form the system network formalises both the paradigmatic relations and their structural consequences (i.e. the units realising them). This dimension of SFL analysis is called axis. Axis privileges system over structure, with features realised through structure and structure motivating system (in other words, if no structural consequence, then no system).
A multivariate structure is a configuration of different functional relationships, like Theme + Rheme, Mood + Residue + Moodtag, or Actor + Process + Recipient + Goal. Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.
The system has one further component, namely the 'realisation statement' that accompanies each option. This specifies the contribution made by that option to the structural configuration; it may be read as a proposition about the structural constraints associated with the option in question.
In Firth's system-structure theory, neither of these is given priority; and in scale and category grammar this perspective was maintained. In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms.
[5] This is potentially misleading, especially in this context. To be clear, individual features are not realised by structure; it is a system of features that is realised by the relationships among the functional elements of structure.
In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. … This step was taken by Halliday in the early 1960s so that grammatical and phonological representations could be freed from constraints of structure.
Martin (2013: 18-9):
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As discussed in Chapter 1, grammatical categories are organized in systems. For example, there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2):
To be clear, PERSON is an interpersonal subsystem of the nominal group for distinguishing interactants, and these from others. Matthiessen (1995: 11):
