The Methodological Aberration That Undermines This Entire Monograph

Martin (2013: 112):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this encapsulates the basic methodological problem in this monograph. Where SFL Theory gives priority to the view 'from above', Martin, while claiming the opposite, gives priority to the view 'from below', by devising systems to account for structures. It is this opposite, contra-functional methodology that naturally leads Martin to call for 'restoring more of a balance between the concerns of system and structure in SFL research' (p69).

Martin's central claim that axial relations underlie the other dimensions of language has been asserted repeatedly throughout the monograph without supporting argument. Moreover, as demonstrated throughout this review, Martin misunderstands axis as axial relations, and the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes, realisation, as the realisation statements in paradigmatic systems.

Genre Staging And Phasing Lower Stratum Context Selections In The Instantiation Of Language

Martin (2013: 111):

Blogger Comments:

For some of the theoretical problems with the model of genre in Martin (1992), see the 69 posts here.

To be clear, Martin (1992) models genre as a (non-metafunctional) stratum of context, located above the systems of field, tenor and mode, which he misunderstands as systems of register. As a consequence, genres (narratives etc.) are modelled as realised by field, tenor and mode features, such as those characterising the relative social status and contact of the speaker/writer and the addressee.

To be clear, even in Martin's model, genre cannot be "a resource for staging field, tenor and mode selections in unfolding discourse" because unfolding discourse is the instantiation of language systems in logogenesis, whereas genre and field, tenor and mode are systems of different strata at the level of context, and are thus not instantiated in language.

Misunderstanding The Metafunctional Hookup

Martin (2013: 108):

Blogger Comments:

On the one hand, Martin's use of "traditionally" here is misleading, because it effaces the theorist responsible. Halliday applied the metafunctions that are intrinsic to language to the cultural context that language realises, yielding ideational field, interpersonal tenor, and textual mode.

On the other hand, this misunderstands SFL's architecture of language in context. The ideational metafunction of language is concerned with the construal of experience as meaning; the interpersonal metafunction of language is concerned with the enactment of intersubjective relations as meaning; and the textual metafunction of language is concerned with weaving ideational and interpersonal meanings together as text.

Field thus is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of the construal of experience; tenor is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of the enactment of intersubjective relations; and mode is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of weaving field and tenor together as situation.

Halliday (2003 [1994]: 437):

The mechanism proposed for this constitutive power of discourse has been referred to as the 'metafunctional hookup': the hypothesis that (a) social contexts are organic — dynamic configurations of three components, called 'field', 'tenor', and 'mode': respectively, the nature of the social activity, the relations among the interactants, and the status accorded to the language (what is going on, who are taking part, and what they are doing with their discourse); and (b) there is a relationship between these and the metafunctions such that these components are construed, respectively, as experiential, as interpersonal, and as textual meanings.

Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

Rebranding A Misunderstanding Of Speech Function As Negotiation

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin's system of NEGOTIATION:

is merely Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION (IFG4: 136):

with

• information rebranded as knowledge
• goods-&-services rebranded as action
• giving and demanding omitted
• the inclusion of a material-order response
• the inclusion of material-order interlocutors.

Confusing Meaners With Meaning Potential

Martin (2013: 105-6):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this again confuses the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) — including even their non-verbal behaviour — with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Confusing Meaners With Meaning

 Martin (2013: 104-5):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, knowers and actors are not language, and so do not constitute semiotic options in an exchange. Again, Martin has confused the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Misunderstanding Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Martin (2013: 97):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, each lexical item is the synthetic realisation of a set of the most delicate grammatical features, as in Hasan's approach, not the realisation of a single grammatical feature, as in Martin's approach. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):

Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations.

An analogy can be found in phonology. For example, the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the set of features [voiced, bilabial stop], not the realisation of a single articulatory feature.

Not Recognising The Distinction Between Word As Grammatical And Word As Lexical

Martin (2013: 95): 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because SFL Theory also uses a constituency model, a rank scale, in which the word is a grammatical constituent. But SFL Theory also models the word as a lexical item, wherein it is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate grammatical features. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9):

The folk notion of the "word" is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. People "look for" words, they "put thoughts into" them, "put them into" or "take them out of another's mouth", and nowadays they keep collections of words on their shelves or in their computers in the form of dictionaries. Specialist knowledge is thought of as a matter of terminology. The taxonomic organisation of vocabulary is less exposed: it is made explicit in Roget's Thesaurus, but is only implicit in a standard dictionary. Lexical taxonomy was the first area of language to be systematically studied by anthropologists, when they began to explore cultural knowledge as it is embodied in folk taxonomies of plants, animals, diseases and the like.

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.. Word-based systems such as these do provide a way in to studying grammatical semantics: but the meanings they construe are always more complex than the categories that appear as formal variants, and grammarians have had to become aware of covert patterns.

"Foregrounding" Paradigmatic Relations

Martin (2013: 95):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, priority is given to system over structure. Here Martin gives priority to structure over system by claiming that the purpose of paradigmatic relations is to account for structures, while simultaneously claiming the opposite: that this is "foregrounding" the paradigmatic.

The Big Lie Of Chapter 5

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This very misleading indeed. Martin has spent the bulk of Chapter 5 arguing that, because of grammatical metaphor, SFL needs two system-structure cycles, as if this were his idea and his argument. See also 

• Falsely Claiming That The Content Plane Was Not Stratified Before Martin (1992).
• On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

Martin furthers this false impression by falsely claiming that Halliday & Matthiessen propose a single system-structure cycle on the content plane for MODALITY, by making a false claim about their lexicogrammatical system, without considering their semantic system.

Martin makes these misleading claims to argue for his own discourse semantic systems, despite the fact that his discourse semantic stratum does not include a system of MODALITY, and he does not provide one here to demonstrate its relation to the lexicogrammatical system.

[2] To be clear, Martin's stratified social systems are his misunderstanding of linguistic registers and genres as the cultural context realised by linguistic systems.

Falsely Finding Fault In The Mood Network Of Halliday & Matthiessen

Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is not true. The feature [explicit] can be selected, and it can be realised: metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of congruently as a modal Adjunct; see previous post. There is thus no need to remove the feature [explicit] from the network.

The Motivation For Speech Function vs Mood

Martin (2013: 83, 84):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the entire content plane into semantic and lexicogrammatical systems is grammatical metaphor. So in the case of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION and grammatical system of MOOD, interpersonal metaphors of mood motivate their stratification. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

Misunderstanding 'From Above' And Rebranding Speech Function As Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 82-3):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misunderstands looking 'from above' as looking 'above' — i.e. from below. Again, this is the direct opposite of SFL methodology. Instead of being concerned with how meaning is realised, Martin is concerned with what wording realises.

[2] Here Martin misleads by rebranding Halliday's semantic system of speech function as Martin's discourse semantic system, which Martin himself proposes.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [1]

Martin (2013: 80):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misleads by misrepresenting Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantics.

[2] To be clear, grammatical structure realises (not "reflects") choices made in the MOOD system.

[3] To be clear, 'congruent' is Halliday's technical term for the agreement between semantics and grammar.

[4] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

The Problem Of Grouping Declarative With Imperative

Martin (2013: 77):

Blogger Comments:

[1] For the generalisation lost in Martin's network, see the previous post.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the grammar is interpreted as the realisation of meaning. So declarative is "grouped" with interrogative, not imperative, under the superordinate indicative, because these two types of indicative are the congruent realisation of propositions, in contradistinction to imperative, which is the congruent realisation of a proposal.

[3] To be clear, the structural realisation of TENSE is specified in a verbal group network, not a clause network.

[4] To be clear, the problem with the MOOD network in Halliday & Matthiessen is easily rectified by adding a superscript 'I' to the system INDICATIVE TYPE, and a superscript 'T' to the system COMMENT. Problems with Martin's networks are not so easily rectified, as this blog has demonstrated.

Misrepresenting Comment Adjuncts

Martin (2013: 76-7):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this network is poorly wired, since there is no need for two sets of wiring from the 'declarative' and 'interrogative' features if the two more delicate systems are represented as conjunctive systems (grouped by a curly bracket).

[2] To be clear, comment Adjuncts, according to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 190):

express the speaker’s attitude either to the proposition as a whole or to the particular speech function. In other words, the target of the comment may be either ideational (the content of the proposition) or interpersonal (the speech function).

That is, the distinction is not one of 'feeling' vs 'dialogism', since both types express an attitude, and both types — e.g. arguably vs broadly — can serve a dialogistic function.

Prioritising The Perspective Of Tagging

Martin (2013: 75-6):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the perspective that Martin prioritises by making it criterial is the opposite perspective to that taken in the methodology of a functional grammar. That is, instead of organising a system on the basis of meaningful distinctions and then stipulating how these are realised structurally, Martin organises a system on the basis of the realisation: whether or not the meaningful choice is realised by a Mood Tag. Importantly, the central argument of this monograph rests on Martin, throughout, mistakenly giving priority to the view 'from below', while claiming the opposite.

Martin's Criticism Of Having A Stop Option In A Recursive System

Martin (2013: 73-4):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the point of having a stop option in a recursive loop is that it provides the only means of stopping the recursion. A recursive loop that does not include a stop option obligatorily goes on forever. 

Martin's Criticism Of Matthiessen's Network

Martin (2013: 73):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here, yet again, Martin adopts the opposite perspective to SFL Theory by giving priority to structure over system.  A grammatical system is devised on the basis of the meaning being realised, not the structures that realise it.

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, Matthiessen's network properly restricts recursion to just those features that can be realised iteratively. Matthiessen (1995: 232):

Martin's clause network, in contrast, allows potentially unlimited insertions of Medium and Process, and potentially unlimited selections of both 'middle' and 'effective' if the feature 'agentive' is selected. So it is Martin's network that does not account for the structures he has presented.

[3] Matthiessen's network only presents recursion in effective clauses because that was the extent of its description. As Matthiessen (ibid.) made clear:

The system network in Figure 4-14 sets out a partial specification of options and their realisations.

It is misleading of Martin to claim that Matthiessen restricts agency to effective clause, because the network is immediately preceded by instances of agency, all of which are middle clauses. Matthiessen (ibid.):

For instance:

The general kept the soldiers marching.
The general helped the soldiers march.
The general required the soldiers to march.
Well they got the army digging

∞

In summary, Martin here misleads the reader by deliberately misrepresenting Matthiessen's network, and promoting his own very poorly constructed network as successful in comparison.