Giving Priority To Structure In Devising System

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The system of MODALITY represents the choices at clause rank. If one of these choices is realised metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of an Adjunct, it can be specified by a realisation statement attached to the feature in the network. Martin's misunderstanding here again derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', structure.

Moreover, in order to account for grammatical metaphor, it is necessary to provide both the congruent and metaphorical analyses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613-4):

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does.

[2] To be clear, the entry condition to clause complexing is the feature clause, and in this metaphor, modality is realised within a clause complex instead of within a clause.

"Systems Tied To Structures"

 Martin (2013: 73):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the notion of 'systems tied to structures' gives priority to structure, which is the opposite perspective to that taken in SFL Theory. The latter perspective gives priority to systems whose realisation statements provide structural specifications. Throughout this entire monograph, Martin has misunderstood realisation statements as axial relations, and axial relations as axis.

Repeating A Bare Assertion That Assumes The Conclusion Of This Monograph

Martin (2013: 73):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. As the examination of this chapter has demonstrated, Martin has not shown that metafunction and rank are based on axis — nor could he.

As previously explained, Martin misunderstands axis as system/structure relations, as stipulated in realisation statements. In SFL Theory, axis is a local dimension whose two orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), with system and structure as their respective dimensions. Realisation statements are located on the paradigmatic axis, and as the name suggests, the relation between the axes is simply realisation.

Moreover, metafunction and rank are not based on either axis or system/structure relations. On the one hand, the metafunctions are a distinct global dimension from the local dimension of axis (ibid.), and first appeared in Language Structure and Language Function (Halliday 1970). 

On the other hand, the SFL approach to constituency, a rank scale, is a distinct local dimension  from the local dimension of axis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), and derives from the method of ranked constituency analysis, rather than immediate constituency analysis, as first set out in Categories of A Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961), and explained more fully in Introduction to Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985).

The rhetorical significance of Martin's misleading bare assertion (the ipse dixit fallacy) is that it assumes the conclusion (the petitio principii fallacy) of the entire monograph. That is, it is one logical fallacy serving another in an invalid argument for a false conclusion. In dialogue, the repeating of this bare assertion would be an example of the logical fallacy known as the argument from repetition.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [4]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, since these are word rank forms marking different reference items. The 'reflexive' form marks an anaphoric reference to the Theme/Subject, whereas the other form does not.

To be clear, the same system "introduces" the Subject, Complement and Adjunct. That is, the MOOD system includes realisation statements that insert these functions in clause structure.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [3]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank. The 'agreement' here is between word rank forms realising group rank functions, not between clause rank functions.

Misunderstanding Word Rank Forms As Clause Rank Functions [2]

Martin (2013: 67):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are word rank markers of clause rank functions, and realisation statements at clause rank specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

[2] To be clear, it is not that these word rank markers of Subject and Finite — i.e. the view 'from below — constitute recognition criteria for Subject and Finite, but that the clause rank elements reprised in the Mood Tag identify the Subject and Finite of the clause.

[3] To be clear, in the system of MOOD, the realisation statement Subject^Finite for the feature informative "refers back" to the realisation statement +Subject for the feature indicative.

Misunderstanding Realisation Statements

Martin (2013: 66):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands realisation statements. Realisation statements are concerned with functions (e.g. Qualifier) in structures, not with forms (e.g. phrase, clause) that realises such functions. Halliday (2003 [1994]: 434-5):

Realisation statements are of seven types:

(a) 'insert' an element (e.g. insert subject);

(b) 'conflate' one element with another (e.g. conflate subject with theme);

(c) 'order' an element with respect to another, or to some defined location (e.g. order finite auxiliary before subject);

(d) 'classify' an element (e.g. classify process as mental: cognition);

(e) 'split' an element into a further configuration (e.g. split mood into subject + finite);

(f) 'preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g. preselect nominal group: human collective); and

(g) 'lexify' an element (e.g. lexify subject: it).

This also repeats the previously noted misunderstanding of of as a linker.

Misunderstanding System And Rank

Martin (2013: 63):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands system and rank. Realisation statements in a clause rank system specify clause rank structure, not the types of group rank units that realise clause rank functions.

Misrepresenting Axis As the Origin Of Metafunction And Rank

Martin (2013: 52):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This gloss of the metafunctions is potentially misleading. The ideation metafunction is the construal of experience, not the construal of discourse, and the interpersonal metafunction is the enactment of interpersonal relations, not the enactment of discourse. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7-8):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world. … The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech roles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others. The textual metafunction is an enabling one; it is concerned with organising ideational and interpersonal meaning as discourse — as meaning that is contextualised and shared.

[2] The claim that 'SFL's distinctive approach to meaning and constituency in fact grew out of the development of axis (system/structure relations) from the early 1960s' is very misleading because it is untrue on several counts.

Firstly, Martin misunderstands axis as system/structure relations, as stipulated in realisation statements. In SFL Theory, axis is a local dimension whose two orders are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), with system and structure as their respective dimensions. Realisation statements are located on the paradigmatic axis, and as the name suggests, the relation between the axes is simply realisation.

Secondly, the SFL approach to the metafunctions and constituency did not grow out of the development of either axis or system/structure relations from the early 1960's. 

On the one hand, the metafunctions are a distinct global dimension from the local dimension of axis (ibid.), and first appeared in Language Structure and Language Function (Halliday 1970). 

On the other hand, the SFL approach to constituency, a rank scale, is a distinct local dimension  from the local dimension of axis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 32), and derives from the method of ranked constituency analysis, rather than immediate constituency analysis, as first set out in Categories of A Theory of Grammar (Halliday 1961), and explained more fully in Introduction to Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985).

The rhetorical significance of Martin's misleading bare assertion (the ipse dixit fallacy) is that it assumes the conclusion (the petitio principii fallacy) of the entire monograph. That is, it is one logical fallacy serving another in an invalid argument for a false conclusion.

Confusing Interpersonal And Ideational Functions

Martin (2013: 49-50):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this network incongruously proposes that an interpersonal feature, major, is realised by the insertion of an experiential function, Process, and does not account for the function Subject.

[2] To be clear, the fact that ba is an enclitic particle does not explain why it varies as to which item it cliticises.

[3] To be clear, the distinction between 'where' and 'when' questions is ideational, not interpersonal.

Building A System On The Basis Of Realisation "Rules"

Martin (2013: 44-5):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Again, he explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

Deriving A System From Structural Realisations

Martin (2013: 43-4):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Again, he explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

[2] To be clear, to specify which interpersonal function the interpersonal WH- element conflates with, it is not necessary to incorporate choices beyond the interpersonal MOOD system. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Distinguishing Mood By Structural Realisation Instead Of The Meaning It Realises

Martin (2013: 43):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Here he also explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

And again, the inclusion of the verbal group feature 'non-finite' in this clause system confuses ranks, and misrepresents imperative clauses, which can include Finite and Subject elements, as non-finite.

Misrepresenting The Finiteness Of Imperative Clauses

Martin (2013: 42-3):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Here Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'.

A further theoretical inconsistency is the inclusion of the verbal group feature 'non-finite' in this clause system. As well as confusing ranks, imperative clauses are finite clauses and can include Finite and Subject elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 165):

In the analysis, the unmarked positive has no Mood element, it consists of Residue (Predicator): the verb form (e.g. look) is Predicator only, with no Finite in it. The other forms have a Mood element; this consists of Subject only (you), Finite only (do, don’t), or Finite followed by Subject (don’t you). Any of these can be followed by a Mood tag: won’t you?, will you? – showing that the clause is finite, even though the verb is non-finite (the imperative of be is be, as in Be quiet!, not the finite form are.

Devising A System 'From Below' Instead Of 'From Above'

Martin (2013: 41, 42):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Here Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below'. In SFL Theory, priority is given to the view 'from above', which, in the case of the MOOD system, is the interpersonal meanings being realised: the clause as exchange. The meanings realised by the grammatical system of MOOD are those of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION: giving vs demanding information vs goods–&–services.

It is from this mistaken inversion of SFL methodology that the misunderstanding of "axial relations" in this monograph derives. 

The Fundamental Misunderstanding Of Axis In This Monograph

Martin (2013: 19):

The realisation of this system in structure has also been specified, with the words I, thou and he following the downward slanting arrow angled from upper left to lower right (the arrow represents 'is realised by'). In this form the system network formalises both the paradigmatic relations and their structural consequences (i.e. the units realising them). This dimension of SFL analysis is called axis. Axis privileges system over structure, with features realised through structure and structure motivating system (in other words, if no structural consequence, then no system).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The network does not even specify any elements of structure, let alone structure. All it specifies is the grammatical form (pronouns) and their formal categories in terms of person. It even contradicts Martin's introduction which opposed words to structure; Martin (2013: 14):

To be clear, structure is constituted by the relationships among the functional elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

A multivariate structure is a configuration of different functional relationships, like Theme + Rheme, Mood + Residue + Moodtag, or Actor + Process + Recipient + Goal. Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue, since a formal unit realising a feature does not constitute a structure, as explained above. What is true is that the system of a unit, such as a clause, is realised by the structure of that unit.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. Axis is a local dimension of language with two orders, paradigmatic and syntagmatic, whose dimensions are system and structure, respectively (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20, 32). Here Martin misunderstands axis as the systemic specification of syntagmatic units. As Halliday (2003 [1994]: 434) explains, such specifications are a component of systems, the paradigmatic order of axis only:

The system has one further component, namely the 'realisation statement' that accompanies each option. This specifies the contribution made by that option to the structural configuration; it may be read as a proposition about the structural constraints associated with the option in question.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. It is not axis that "privileges" system over structure but SFL Theory. Halliday (2003 [1994]: 433):

In Firth's system-structure theory, neither of these is given priority; and in scale and category grammar this perspective was maintained. In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms.

[5] This is potentially misleading, especially in this context. To be clear, individual features are not realised by structure; it is a system of features that is realised by the relationships among the functional elements of structure.

[6] To be clear, here Martin is giving priority to structure over system, thereby contradicting his own misunderstanding of axis, and taking the opposite perspective to that of SFL Theory.

[7] To be clear, Martin has already provided two networks that contradict this claim: the PERSON system above, and traffic light system (p3):

Moreover, as Halliday (2003 [1994]: 433-4) explains:

In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. … This step was taken by Halliday in the early 1960s so that grammatical and phonological representations could be freed from constraints of structure.

Outline Of Chapter 3

Martin (2013: 10):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 3.

Firstly, the distinction between class (e.g. verbal group) and function (e.g. process) is not a distinction between categories and relations, since both are categories, and neither are relations.

Secondly, realisation statements are not used to derive structure from system, since realisation statements only specify such things as the insertion of an element, or the ordering of elements in a structure. No realisation statement specifies a structure: the relationships among functions such as Senser^Process^Phenomenon.

Thirdly, because of this, realisation statements do not "formalise" the complementarity of system and structure.