Interrogative Identifying Clauses In Tagalog

 Martin (2013: 50):

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To be clear, these are interrogative forms of the thematic equative:

The information that the first clause demands is a decoding of the Token sino ('who') by reference to the Value ang naglaro ('who plays'), and the information that the second clause demands is a decoding of the Token ano ('what') by reference to the Value ang ginawa mo ('what you did') — Martin's second gloss notwithstanding. Analogous clauses in English are who is it who plays and what is it you did.

The fact that these clauses are thematic equatives casts further doubt on Martin's thematic analysis of Tagalog. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 93, 95) explain for English:

This kind of clause is known as a thematic equative (cf. Halliday, 1967/8), because it sets up the Theme + Rheme structure in the form of an equation, where Theme = Rheme. The particular clause type that is being exploited to form a thematic equative is the identifying clause… . In a thematic equative, all the elements of the clause are organised into two constituents; these two are then linked by a relationship of identity, a kind of ‘equals sign’, expressed by some form of the verb be. …

A thematic equative (which is usually called a ‘pseudo-cleft sentence’ in formal grammar) is an identifying clause which has a thematic nominalisation in it. Its function is to express the Theme-Rheme structure in such a way as to allow for the Theme to consist of any subset of the elements of the clause. This is the explanation for the evolution of clauses of this type: they have evolved, in English, as a thematic resource, enabling the message to be structured in whatever way the speaker or writer wants.

If the same is true of Tagalog, then thematic equatives may be a resource for highlighting a different element as Theme. In English, for example, it is used to avoid selecting an unwanted marked Theme (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 97).

Confusing Interpersonal And Ideational Functions

Martin (2013: 49-50):

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[1] Again, this network incongruously proposes that an interpersonal feature, major, is realised by the insertion of an experiential function, Process, and does not account for the function Subject.

[2] To be clear, the fact that ba is an enclitic particle does not explain why it varies as to which item it cliticises.

[3] To be clear, the distinction between 'where' and 'when' questions is ideational, not interpersonal.

Misunderstanding 'Structure' In WH- Interrogatives

Martin (2013: 49):

Blogger Comments:

Again, Martin's notion that functional elements of different metafunctions can occur in the same structural configuration misunderstands the notion of structure, which, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451) make clear, is the relationships among functions:

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Martin's structures propose a relationship between experiential elements, Process and Location, and textual Theme, and each of these with interpersonal Q and WH- elements, while omitting other textual and interpersonal elements, Subject and Predicator.

One way to repair Martin's analyses might be:

However, there is reason to doubt these two analyses, and the previous one, because the Theme always happens to conflate with the Subject, and this echoes Martin's misunderstanding of Theme in English. See, for example, Misconstruing Subject And Theme and Misconstruing Marked Topical Theme.

Misunderstanding 'Structure' In Polar Interrogatives

 Martin (2013: 48):

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To be clear, the notion that functional elements of different metafunctions can occur in the same structural configuration misunderstands the notion of structure, which, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451) make clear, is the relationships among functions:

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Martin's structure proposes a relationship between experiential Process and textual Theme, and each of these with interpersonal Q, and omits other textual and interpersonal elements .

One way to repair Martin's analysis might be:

An Experiential Function Realising An Interpersonal Option

Martin (2013: 47-8):

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[1] To be clear, it is necessary to distinguish an interpersonal Predicator from an experiential Process, because a Predicator is enactment of the self as meaning, whereas a Process is a construal of experience as meaning. As a function, a Predicator is related to other elements of mood structure, such as Subject, Complement and Adjunct, whereas a Process is related to other elements of transitivity structure, such as Medium, Agent and Range. Moreover, there is no "morphology of the Process", since Process is a function at clause rank, not a class of form, verb, at word rank.

[2] To be clear, this network incongruously proposes that an interpersonal feature, major, is realised by the insertion of an experiential function, Process, and does not account for the function Subject.

Rebranding Halliday's Work As Martin's

Martin (2013: 45-6):

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Again, this augmentation for devising the system network begins by taking the view 'from below': grammatical form and structure. 

The claim that the second perspective is 'discourse' semantic is misleading, because it rebrands Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's system. Martin has made a career out of rebranding other people's work as his own, as demonstrated here and here, for example, and has even won a prize for it (recorded here).

Building A System On The Basis Of Realisation "Rules"

Martin (2013: 44-5):

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Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Again, he explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

Deriving A System From Structural Realisations

Martin (2013: 43-4):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Again, he explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

[2] To be clear, to specify which interpersonal function the interpersonal WH- element conflates with, it is not necessary to incorporate choices beyond the interpersonal MOOD system. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

Distinguishing Mood By Structural Realisation Instead Of The Meaning It Realises

Martin (2013: 43):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Again Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'. Here he also explicitly distinguishes mood types on the basis of their structural realisations instead of in terms of the speech functions they congruently realise.

And again, the inclusion of the verbal group feature 'non-finite' in this clause system confuses ranks, and misrepresents imperative clauses, which can include Finite and Subject elements, as non-finite.

Misrepresenting The Finiteness Of Imperative Clauses

Martin (2013: 42-3):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Here Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below', instead of the view 'from above'.

A further theoretical inconsistency is the inclusion of the verbal group feature 'non-finite' in this clause system. As well as confusing ranks, imperative clauses are finite clauses and can include Finite and Subject elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 165):

In the analysis, the unmarked positive has no Mood element, it consists of Residue (Predicator): the verb form (e.g. look) is Predicator only, with no Finite in it. The other forms have a Mood element; this consists of Subject only (you), Finite only (do, don’t), or Finite followed by Subject (don’t you). Any of these can be followed by a Mood tag: won’t you?, will you? – showing that the clause is finite, even though the verb is non-finite (the imperative of be is be, as in Be quiet!, not the finite form are.

Devising A System 'From Below' Instead Of 'From Above'

Martin (2013: 41, 42):

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To be clear, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Here Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below'. In SFL Theory, priority is given to the view 'from above', which, in the case of the MOOD system, is the interpersonal meanings being realised: the clause as exchange. The meanings realised by the grammatical system of MOOD are those of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION: giving vs demanding information vs goods–&–services.

It is from this mistaken inversion of SFL methodology that the misunderstanding of "axial relations" in this monograph derives. 

Confusing Function With Form

 Martin (2013: 40):

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To be clear, in SFL Theory, features of systems, such as the MOOD system, are not classes. It is form, not function, that is categorised into classes; e.g. word classes, group classes.

Misunderstanding Redundancy And Structure

Martin (2013: 40):

Technically speaking, as noted above, a sequence of classes redounding with one another is referred to as a syntagm. Redounding functions are referred to as structures. … By 'redound' we mean that the classes of functions are redundant with respect to one another — in other words they are mutually expectant (given one class or function the co-appearance of another is not random). This is simply a more technical way to say that the classes form a syntagm or that the functions form a structure and so make a meaning beyond the sum of their parts.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the notion of redundancy. To be clear, 'redundancy' refers to the skewing of probabilities away from equiprobability. Halliday (2003 [1987]: 122):

In an ideal system, one having two states that are equiprobable, there is no redundancy. Once we depart from equiprobability, redundancy sets in. In all open systems the probabilities are skewed, so that the system carries redundancy.

In SFL Theory, 'redundancy' is used to refer to realisation relations between strata. Halliday (2002 [1992]: 356):

Consider a minimal semiotic system, such as a protolanguage – a system that is made up of simple signs. This is based on the principle of redundancy. When we say that contents p, q, r are “realised” respectively by expressions a, b, c, what this means is that there is a redundancy relation between them: given meaning p, we can predict sound or gesture a, and given sound or gesture a we can predict meaning p. This relationship is symmetrical; “redounds with” is equivalent both to “realises” and to “is realised by”.

with these probabilities variably skewed along the cline of instantiation. Halliday (2002 [1992]: 359):

The [language] system is permeable because each instance redounds with the context of situation, and so perturbs the system in interaction with the environment.

Halliday (2003 [1997]: 260):

If we consider register variation first: viewing from the "instance" end, we can recognise a text type as a collection of similar instances. But when we shift perspective and see it as systemic variation, each of these text types appears as a register, a kind of subsystem which redounds with the properties of the context in terms of field, tenor and mode.

Martin, however, misunderstands the skewed probabilities of redundancy as just any mutual expectancy, and applies this to the sequencing of items on the syntagmatic axis.

[2] As demonstrated above, redundancy is not a more technical way of saying that syntagms and structures "make a meaning beyond the sum of their parts". The crucial point that Martin omits is that, just as a system is the relationships among its features, a structure is the relationships among its functions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Confusing Mood Adjuncts With Comment Adjuncts

Martin (2013: 37, 39):

And in other contexts verbs are used to classify (and are thus not gradable):

running shoes

industrialised nations

… Imperative clauses, giving commands, are typically indicated in English by the absence of a Finite and a Subject function.

In addition Halliday recognises Modal Adjuncts which add an interpersonal comment of some kind to the clause (a modalisation of probability below) …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, industrialised is gradable: there are less industrialised nations and more industrialised nations.

[2] To be clear, 'giving' is a poor choice of words, pedagogically, since commands involve demanding goods-&-services, as opposed to giving them.

[3] This is misleading, because, within the category of modal Adjunct, SFL Theory distinguishes between mood Adjuncts and comment Adjuncts. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 184):

We can recognise two types of modal Adjuncts, (i) mood Adjuncts and (ii) comment Adjuncts. (i) Mood Adjuncts serve within the Mood element, and are closely associated with the meaning of the Finite element – the limiting case being modality, which (as we have seen) can also be realised by the operator serving as Finite. (ii) Comment Adjuncts serve outside the Mood + Residue structure of the clause. They are not part of the proposition realised by Mood + Residue, but are instead comments on it (propositional) or on the act of exchanging it (speech-functional).

Outline Of Chapter 3

Martin (2013: 10):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 3.

Firstly, the distinction between class (e.g. verbal group) and function (e.g. process) is not a distinction between categories and relations, since both are categories, and neither are relations.

Secondly, realisation statements are not used to derive structure from system, since realisation statements only specify such things as the insertion of an element, or the ordering of elements in a structure. No realisation statement specifies a structure: the relationships among functions such as Senser^Process^Phenomenon.

Thirdly, because of this, realisation statements do not "formalise" the complementarity of system and structure.