Misrepresenting Single Forms As Function Structures

Martin (2013: 28, 31):

… we have been dealing with pronoun systems realisation by single unit structures (by single words) above …

In the next chapter we'll move on to consider system networks realised by structures consisting of more than one element …

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is not true. Martin has not even been dealing with functional elements of structure, let alone structures. He has only been dealing with forms, pronouns, and devising networks by giving priority to form over function in doing so — the opposite approach to that taken in SFL Theory. To be clear, a structure is the relationships among functions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Comparing Tagalog And English Person & Number Systems

Martin (2013: 24-5):

Our system network formulation of the revised paradigm is presented below, with PERSON and NUMBER as simultaneous systems, but with a different set of oppositions than those we distinguished when working on the English systems. From this we can see that although English and Tagalog have comparable regions of meaning as far as their pronouns grammar is concerned, no pronoun in one of the two languages can ever be the exact equivalent of a pronoun in the other — because the valeur, to use Saussure's term, is different. The systems are comparable but not equivalent.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's revised paradigm is just Schachter & Otanes' paradigm with different labels:

Martin has replaced Schachter & Otanes' 'non-plural' and 'plural' with Schachter & Otanes' gloss of their own labels, and replaced their formal categories of person with Halliday's functional categories, as previously explained.

[2] This is misleading. Because Martin used formal categories for English and functional categories for Tagalog, the comparability of the meanings is obscured. For example, if English were presented in these functional terms, the only difference between the two would be the absence of the "speaker/addressee" feature in English.

Note that, from an SFL perspective, English does make a distinction in meaning between 'only' and '+others' for 'addressee', it is just that the same form you realises both feature combinations. The distinction in meaning is demonstrated, for example, by the dialectal use of youse and y'all as realisations for the '+others' meaning.

Misunderstanding Halliday On The Ineffability Of Grammatical Categories

Martin (2013: 24):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because On The Ineffability Of Grammatical Categories (Halliday 1984) is not at all about a balancing act of 'respecting both terminological traditions and the language to hand'. Instead, the paper explains that grammatical categories can only mean themselves. That is, while it is possible to provide an encoding definition of a grammatical category (how it is expressed), it is not possible to provide a decoding definition of a grammatical category (what it means). Halliday (2002 [1984]: 292-3, 303, 307, 309):

Once having reified these abstract categories by naming them, the Greek grammarians went on to ask what the names meant. What ‘is’ a noun? they wondered. At first, this was a question of: how do I recognise a noun when I see it? how do I know whether something is a noun or not? But before long the questions came to be asked in the other direction: what ‘is’ a noun, in the sense of what function does it serve? At this second stage, instead of treating ‘noun’ as the Value and then supplying a Token for it, the definition now treats ‘noun’ as the Token and seeks to supply a Value for it. Instead of ‘a noun is a word that inflects for number and case’, we have ‘a noun is the name of a person, creature or thing’. This is a decoding definition, one which embodies a notion of ‘what the category means’. … But how does one define by decoding? how do we say what a grammatical category means? …

The meaning of a typical grammatical category thus has no counterpart in our conscious representation of things. There can be no exact paraphrase of Subject or Actor or Theme – because there is no language-independent clustering of phenomena in our experience to which they correspond. If there was, we should not need the linguistic category to create one. If language was a purely passive partner, ‘expressing’ a ‘reality’ that was already there, its categories would be eminently glossable. But it is not. Language is an active participant in the semogenic process. Language creates reality – and therefore its categories of content cannot be defined, since we could define them only by relating them to some pre-existing model of experience, and there is no model of experience until the linguistic categories are there to model it. The only meaning of Subject is the meaning that has evolved along with the category itself. …

To understand these categories, it is no use asking what they mean. The question is not ‘what is the meaning of this or that function or feature in the grammar?’; but rather ‘what is encoded in this language, or in this register (functional variety) of the language?’ This reverses the perspective derived from the history of linguistics, in which a language is a system of forms, with meanings attached to make sense of them. Instead, a language is treated as a system of meanings, with forms attached to express them. Not grammatical paradigms with their interpretation, but semantic paradigms with their realisations. …

What I have been trying to show with this illustration is that while, with a category like Subject, it is impossible to answer the question ‘what does it mean?’, this does not signify that it has no meaning. The problem of ineffability is common to all grammatical categories; there are various reasons why some may seem less problematic than others, but it is an illusion to think that any can be exhaustively defined. And this, as I remarked above, is not because of the shortcomings of natural language for serving as a metalanguage, real though such shortcomings are. Rather the converse: it is the very richness of natural language, its power of distilling the entire collective experience of the culture into a single manageable, and learnable, code that puts its categories beyond the reach of our conscious attempts at exegesis.

Misrepresenting Others' Work As Martin's Invention

Martin (2013: 24-5):

We've adjusted the labelling for the paradigm below, to better capture the proportionalities involved. Instead of using traditional PERSON and NUMBER labels we've turned to discourse semantics, and chosen more transparent terms to capture what is going on. One problem with this for some linguists is that our labels now sound more contextual than grammatical, and formal grammarians might object to them on such grounds; and they are perhaps less familiar to linguists than the traditional ones, and so outsiders might find them harder to understand. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because discourse semantics is Martin's model, and so claiming to be drawing on discourse semantics here is claiming that this labelling is Martin's work, whereas the truth is that it is not. On the one hand, the PERSON categories are from Halliday's lexicogrammar, not Martin's discourse semantics. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 40, 41):

… there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2). …

On the other hand, the NUMBER categories are derived from Martin's source, Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88), not Martin's discourse semantics:

The plural pronouns have, as a group, the meanings of the corresponding non-plural pronouns with the additional meaning 'and others' (or 'and another'): thus the first-person plural is literally 'I and others', the dual plural 'you (singular) and I and others', etc.

[2] To be clear, the claim here is that a problem with more transparent terms is that they might be harder to understand.

[3] Trivially, in SFL Theory, 'context' is the culture modelled as a semiotic system, and formal grammarians do not use 'context' in this sense, so the labels that Martin has falsely claimed to be his own would not look more 'contextual' to them, and so would not be their grounds for objecting to them.

Misrepresenting A Formal Approach To Tagalog Pronoun Classification

Martin (2013: 23-4):

Tagalog makes a distinction between what is generally referred to as inclusive and exclusive 'we' — a distinction in other words between reference to the speaker and one or more others, including the addressee, and the speaker and one or more others, excluding the addressee. … Schachter & Otanes (1972) label the paradigm they propose as follows:

Their labelling raises two questions. The first issue is the choice of the label non-plural instead of singular; this is presumably because the pronoun kata, which refers to the speaker and one addressee, involves more than one person (so is not singular). The second concern is the label dual; this is a rather odd choice of term, since dual is usually used as part of a NUMBER system ([singular], [dual], [trial], [paucal], [plural] etc.) not a PERSON system; and in any case, the 'plural' inclusive pronoun tayo refers to more than two people (the speaker, addressee, and one or more others). But we can see the problem Schachter & Otanes have here: the categories they inherited from the Greco-Roman tradition don't fit — because Tagalog has four persons not three.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there is no need for Martin to presume this about the label 'non-plural' because Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88) are quite explicit about it:

The first group is called non-plural rather than singular because it included dual pronouns, meaning literally 'you (singular) and I'.

[2] To be clear, this misleads by ignoring the explanation given by the authors. Schachter & Otanes (1972: 88) explain the reasoning behind their number proportionalities as follows:

The plural pronouns have, as a group, the meanings of the corresponding non-plural pronouns with the additional meaning 'and others' (or 'and another'): thus the first-person plural is literally 'I and others', the dual plural 'you (singular) and I and others', etc.

Martin's purpose in ignoring the explanation given by the authors will be seen in the following post.

[3] This is misleading. An alternative Formal approach to classifying personal pronouns does "fit":

[4] This is misleading because it is not true. Tagalog has three persons, not four, since, as Martin himself acknowledges, 'dual' is a number category, not a person category.

Misrepesenting The 'General Disposition' Of Grammarians

Martin (2013: 23):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the treatment of you as an outsider and it as an exception reflects the disposition of Martin to misrepresent a systemic approach to formal grammar as a systemic approach to functional grammar. In the next section, on Tagalog pronouns, where he switches to functional features, he will falsely claim that this will be taking a discourse semantic approach, and so Martinian, rather than a grammatical approach, and so Hallidayan.

Classifying Forms (Personal Pronouns) In Terms Of Formal Categories (Case)

Martin (2013: 22-3):

As far as NUMBER and GENDER are concerned it is a regular part of the system; but as far as CASE is concerned it is an exception. The usual strategy for showing exceptions of this kind in SFL is to use a marking convention that blocks specific combinations of features. We can read the 'I' superscript on the feature [neuter] along these lines and connect it to the 'T' superscript on [nominative] (read as 'if [neuter] then [nominative]', and so not [accusative]). Note that this means arbitrarily describing it as [nominative], and lacking an accusative form. …  

CASE is introduced as a third system, simultaneous with NUMBER and GENDER below. The if/then marking convention has been deployed in the network, but realisations have been informally provided as a list, rather than being tied to specific features (except for you).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is again classifying form (a pronoun) in terms of formal categories (case) instead of systemising functions.

[2] Note that this means misrepresenting the data, since it is the accusative form as well as the nominative form. That is, it is a misuse of the conditional marking.

[3] To be clear, these are not functions, but forms specified by formal categories. Martin's motivation for modelling forms instead of functions will become clear in the review of his Tagalog PERSON systems.

Giving Priority To Form Over Function

Martin (2013: 22):

As a final step we can consider adding CASE to the system, and so distinguish between pronouns which reference the nub of the argument (grammatically the Subject of a clause) and those which don't (grammatically the Complement of a clause or prepositional phrase, or the 'subject' of a non-finite clause) — cf. She noticed him texting me for them.

I, she, he, it, you, we, they

me, him, her, us them

Fortunately you remains the odd one out, since it doesn't distinguish either NUMBER or CASE. That effectively leaves us with the problem of it, which is [singular] and [neuter], as we saw above. As far as NUMBER and GENDER are concerned it is a regular part of the system; but as far as CASE is concerned it is an exception.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'case' is a formal category, not a functional one, so it is misleading to present it as a system in a work purporting to be 'a next step' into Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] To be clear, distinguishing between pronouns is distinguishing between forms, not functions, so it is misleading to present them as features in a system in a work purporting to be 'a next step' into Systemic Functional Grammar.

[3] This is misleading. Pronouns don't reference the Subject; the nominal group in which a pronoun figures realises the Subject. Such a pronoun references an entity elsewhere — either (endophorically) in the text, or (exophorically) in the environment of a text.

[4] This is misleading because it uses the opposite methodology to that of Systemic Functional Grammar. That is, it gives priority to the view 'from below', form, instead of the view 'from above', function.

Giving Priority To Structure And Form Over System And Function

Martin (2013: 21-2):

Once thou was lost, English speakers would have had to deploy alternative resources to negotiate their social relations. And this means that we need to revise our pronoun network for standard English, as outlined below (setting aside GENDER for the moment to simplify the presentation).

It might be objected that we should keep the same system we developed for Shakespeare's times, and simply allow you to realise both second person singular and plural; this is the grammarian's concept of neutralisation. But we're going to be very stringent in our introduction to axial relations here and argue that if there is no difference in structure then there is no difference in system. Accordingly, we oppose above first and third person pronouns that distinguish NUMBER to second person pronouns which don't. This illustrates a very important strategy for network drawing — namely, setting aside, as early in delicacy as possible, classes that in some sense lie outside the system. Since you is different from other pronouns, we set it aside, and then move on to capture the parameters that the rest of the system shares.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, interlocutors enact their social relations. A child does not negotiate her status or institutional role with a teacher. Negotiating propositions and proposals is a different matter.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, it wasn't that thou was lost and speakers were forced to 'deploy alternative resources'. It was because speakers 'deployed alternative resources' that the use of thou diminished.

[3] To be clear, this is the methodology of SFL Theory, where priority is given to system and function over structure and form. Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 62):

[4] To be clear, the relation between the axes is simply realisation.

[5] This is misleading. To be clear, this approach gives priority to structure over system, the exact opposite of SFL methodology. Martin (p10) has previously acknowledged SFL methodology:

so his contradiction here demonstrates that he does not understand what it means to give priority to system over structure. The misunderstanding also invalidates the fundamental premise of this monograph.

[6] This is misleading. To be clear, this is again giving priority to form (pronouns, classes) over function, the exact opposite of SFL methodology.

Giving Priority To The View 'From Below' [2]

Martin (2013: 20):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this network is misleading in that it misrepresents the approach of SFL Theory. To be clear:

1. the realisations of these features are not structures, or even functions, but grammatical form (pronouns),
2. the features 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, and
3. the network gives priority to the view 'from below' instead of 'from above', since it is using form to derive systems.

On this last point, the method of SFL Theory is to identify how meanings are expressed, but Martin's method is to identify what expressions mean.

Cf. Matthiessen (1995: 390):

Giving Priority To The View 'From Below' [1]

Martin (2013: 19-20):

Blogger Comments:

This network is misleading in that it misrepresents the approach of SFL Theory. To be clear:

1. the realisations of these features are not structures, or even functions, but grammatical form (pronouns),
2. the features 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, and
3. the network gives priority to the view 'from below' instead of 'from above', since it is using form to derive systems.

On this last point, the method of SFL Theory is to identify how meanings are expressed, but Martin's method is to identify what expressions mean.

Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 62):

… there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2):

This intersects with a system of NUMBER, opposing ‘one’ to ‘more than one’ (see Figure 2-3).

The way these two combine varies among different languages; for the version found in (modern standard) English, see Table 2-1 and, for further detail, Chapter 6.

Misunderstanding The Labelling Of Systems And Features

Martin (2013: 19):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, systems and their features are labelled according to the functions that they distinguish. Because 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, but formal categories, they do not feature in system networks. That is the problem Martin has unnecessarily created by using them.

Clearly, the terms 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not "rather arbitrary" and do not "privilege" the speaker. They merely present the perspective of the person actually producing the text. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 383-4):

The personal pronoun represents the world according to the speaker, in the context of a speech exchange. The basic distinction is into speech roles (I, you) and other roles (he, she, it, they); there is also the generalised pronoun (one). These categories are set out in Figure 6-4.

The Fundamental Misunderstanding Of Axis In This Monograph

Martin (2013: 19):

The realisation of this system in structure has also been specified, with the words I, thou and he following the downward slanting arrow angled from upper left to lower right (the arrow represents 'is realised by'). In this form the system network formalises both the paradigmatic relations and their structural consequences (i.e. the units realising them). This dimension of SFL analysis is called axis. Axis privileges system over structure, with features realised through structure and structure motivating system (in other words, if no structural consequence, then no system).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The network does not even specify any elements of structure, let alone structure. All it specifies is the grammatical form (pronouns) and their formal categories in terms of person. It even contradicts Martin's introduction which opposed words to structure; Martin (2013: 14):

To be clear, structure is constituted by the relationships among the functional elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

A multivariate structure is a configuration of different functional relationships, like Theme + Rheme, Mood + Residue + Moodtag, or Actor + Process + Recipient + Goal. Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue, since a formal unit realising a feature does not constitute a structure, as explained above. What is true is that the system of a unit, such as a clause, is realised by the structure of that unit.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. Axis is a local dimension of language with two orders, paradigmatic and syntagmatic, whose dimensions are system and structure, respectively (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20, 32). Here Martin misunderstands axis as the systemic specification of syntagmatic units. As Halliday (2003 [1994]: 434) explains, such specifications are a component of systems, the paradigmatic order of axis only:

The system has one further component, namely the 'realisation statement' that accompanies each option. This specifies the contribution made by that option to the structural configuration; it may be read as a proposition about the structural constraints associated with the option in question.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. It is not axis that "privileges" system over structure but SFL Theory. Halliday (2003 [1994]: 433):

In Firth's system-structure theory, neither of these is given priority; and in scale and category grammar this perspective was maintained. In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms.

[5] This is potentially misleading, especially in this context. To be clear, individual features are not realised by structure; it is a system of features that is realised by the relationships among the functional elements of structure.

[6] To be clear, here Martin is giving priority to structure over system, thereby contradicting his own misunderstanding of axis, and taking the opposite perspective to that of SFL Theory.

[7] To be clear, Martin has already provided two networks that contradict this claim: the PERSON system above, and traffic light system (p3):

Moreover, as Halliday (2003 [1994]: 433-4) explains:

In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. … This step was taken by Halliday in the early 1960s so that grammatical and phonological representations could be freed from constraints of structure.

Systemising Form Instead Of Function

 Martin (2013: 18-9):





Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, in Systemic Functional Linguistics, system networks are used to model function not form. This network models forms (pronouns) in terms of the formal categories (1st, 2nd, 3rd). Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: ):

As discussed in Chapter 1, grammatical categories are organized in systems. For example, there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2):

To be clear, PERSON is an interpersonal subsystem of the nominal group for distinguishing interactants, and these from others. Matthiessen (1995: 11):

Outline Of Chapter 2

Martin (2013: 10):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 2. For example, the realisations specified in Martin's PERSON systems are grammatical items (I, thou, he etc.) that may realise a function (e.g. Thing as Subject), not structures. A structure is the relationships among functions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.