Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

What Martin Has Done In Chapter 5

Martin (2013: 93-4):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'bundles of interdependent features' are systems, and system is the means of modelling choice across the dimensions of language, such as metafunction, rank and stratification.

[2] To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar is grammatical metaphor, and two system-structure cycles are merely the consequence of the stratification.

[3] To be clear, in giving priority to 'structural generalisations', Martin is giving priority to the view 'from below', in contradistinction to the SFL methodology of giving priority to the view 'from above'.

[4] To be clear, the number of system-structure cycles on the content plane is not an issue in SFL Theory, since it follows as a direct consequence from Halliday's original stratification.

[5] To be clear, it is only Halliday's semantics that provides a systematic account of grammatical metaphor, not Martin's discourse semantics. This is why Martin has used Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION in his discussion. The reader is invited to try using the systems of IDEATION and CONJUNCTION in Martin (1992) to describe ideational metaphor, given that both are textual grammatical systems, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, relabelled as Martin's ideational discourse semantic systems, and as such, CONJUNCTION, for example, does not account for the logico-semantic relation of projection.

The Big Lie Of Chapter 5

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This very misleading indeed. Martin has spent the bulk of Chapter 5 arguing that, because of grammatical metaphor, SFL needs two system-structure cycles, as if this were his idea and his argument. See also 

• Falsely Claiming That The Content Plane Was Not Stratified Before Martin (1992).
• On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

Martin furthers this false impression by falsely claiming that Halliday & Matthiessen propose a single system-structure cycle on the content plane for MODALITY, by making a false claim about their lexicogrammatical system, without considering their semantic system.

Martin makes these misleading claims to argue for his own discourse semantic systems, despite the fact that his discourse semantic stratum does not include a system of MODALITY, and he does not provide one here to demonstrate its relation to the lexicogrammatical system.

[2] To be clear, Martin's stratified social systems are his misunderstanding of linguistic registers and genres as the cultural context realised by linguistic systems.

Falsely Finding Fault In The Mood Network Of Halliday & Matthiessen

Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is not true. The feature [explicit] can be selected, and it can be realised: metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of congruently as a modal Adjunct; see previous post. There is thus no need to remove the feature [explicit] from the network.

Giving Priority To Structure In Devising System

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The system of MODALITY represents the choices at clause rank. If one of these choices is realised metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of an Adjunct, it can be specified by a realisation statement attached to the feature in the network. Martin's misunderstanding here again derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', structure.

Moreover, in order to account for grammatical metaphor, it is necessary to provide both the congruent and metaphorical analyses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613-4):

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does.

[2] To be clear, the entry condition to clause complexing is the feature clause, and in this metaphor, modality is realised within a clause complex instead of within a clause.

The Motivation For Speech Function vs Mood

Martin (2013: 83, 84):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the entire content plane into semantic and lexicogrammatical systems is grammatical metaphor. So in the case of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION and grammatical system of MOOD, interpersonal metaphors of mood motivate their stratification. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [2]

Martin (2013: 81):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

Misrepresenting Interpersonal Metaphor Of Mood

Martin (2013: 80-1):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'stratal tension between discourse function and MOOD' is the incongruent (metaphorical) realisation of SPEECH FUNCTION in MOOD. 

[2] To be clear, the metaphorical realisations do not "dress themselves up lexicogrammatically as commands". Lexicogrammatically, they are just like any other indicative clauses. The difference is semantic, not lexicogrammatical, since they realise proposals (demanding goods-&-services) rather than propositions (giving or demanding information) in terms of SPEECH FUNCTION.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [1]

Martin (2013: 80):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misleads by misrepresenting Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantics.

[2] To be clear, grammatical structure realises (not "reflects") choices made in the MOOD system.

[3] To be clear, 'congruent' is Halliday's technical term for the agreement between semantics and grammar.

[4] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.