Misconstruing The Material As Semiotic

Martin (2013: 104):

Blogger Comments:

[1] As throughout this monograph, contrā SFL methodology, Martin here again gives priority to the view 'from below' by developing networks to account for structures,

[2] To be clear, knowledge and action are merely rebrandings of the speech function commodities information and goods-&-services, respectively.

[3] To be clear, in linguistics, the term 'prospective' is used to describe Indicating grammatically that an activity about to begin. This is the opposite of not providing a verbal response. Martin has here mistaken a material order action for a semiotic order response.

Prioritising The Perspective Of Tagging

Martin (2013: 75-6):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the perspective that Martin prioritises by making it criterial is the opposite perspective to that taken in the methodology of a functional grammar. That is, instead of organising a system on the basis of meaningful distinctions and then stipulating how these are realised structurally, Martin organises a system on the basis of the realisation: whether or not the meaningful choice is realised by a Mood Tag. Importantly, the central argument of this monograph rests on Martin, throughout, mistakenly giving priority to the view 'from below', while claiming the opposite.

Confusing Ranks

Martin (2013: 67-8):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this poses no problems for a clause rank system and its realisation statements, because these are lower rank markers of a clause rank distinction, polarity, and realisation statements at clause rank only specify structural consequences at clause rank, or preselect a systemic feature at group/phrase rank.

Mistaking Thing For "Focus"

Martin (2013: 65):

Some examples [of Martin's Focus function] are given below.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, analyses of these structures after Halliday (1985, 1994) have been inconsistent and even self-contradictory. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 333, 2014: 394) write that the Thing

… is the entity that is functioning as participant in the transitivity structure of the clause …

If this principle is applied to the examples above, then six of the seven do not include a "Focus" function, as demonstrated by:

the front of the stage is wider than the back.
 an album is a collection of songs.
a chapter of the book was removed by censors.
the length of the stage is 9 metres
a Nobel Laureate is typically a genius of a writer
ragtime is a kind of jazz 

On the other hand, the coverage in Halliday (1985, 1994) is restricted to 'measure' expressions and 'facet' expressions, the latter being an optional alternative approach to Head/Thing conflation. The 'measure' expressions are analysed as complex Numeratives or Pre-Numeratives, and the 'facet' expressions as Pre-Deictics. Halliday (1994: 195-6):

Using the Halliday (1985, 1994) analysis:

the front of the stage is Pre-Deictic

a collection of songs is complex Numerative: collective

a chapter of the book is Pre-Numerative: partitive

three of the songs is Pre-Numerative: quantitive

the length of the stage is Thing

a genius of a writer is Thing

a kind of jazz is Thing

However, using the Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014) analysis (see previous post):

the front of the stage is extended Numerative: partitive: facet

a collection of songs is extended Numerative: collective: aggregate

a chapter of the book is extended Numerative: partitive: portion

three of the songs is embedded Numerative

the length of the stage is Thing

a genius of a writer is Thing

a kind of jazz is extended Numerative: collective: variety

Devising A System 'From Below' Instead Of 'From Above'

Martin (2013: 41, 42):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this misrepresents SFL methodology. Here Martin constructs a system on the basis of how it is realised structurally. This is giving priority to the view 'from below'. In SFL Theory, priority is given to the view 'from above', which, in the case of the MOOD system, is the interpersonal meanings being realised: the clause as exchange. The meanings realised by the grammatical system of MOOD are those of the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION: giving vs demanding information vs goods–&–services.

It is from this mistaken inversion of SFL methodology that the misunderstanding of "axial relations" in this monograph derives. 

Confusing Function With Form

 Martin (2013: 40):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, features of systems, such as the MOOD system, are not classes. It is form, not function, that is categorised into classes; e.g. word classes, group classes.

Outline Of Chapter 4

Martin (2013: 10-1):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 4.

Firstly, it is not language that "privileges" systems over structure or formalises systemic relations as system networks but Systemic Functional Linguistics. Here Martin mistakes the data for the theory.

Secondly, it is the principles underlying the metafunctions that "bundle" clause systems, not the reverse. The metafunctions give rise to the systems, not the reverse. The systems are devised according to the metafunctions, not the reverse.

Thirdly, it is the modelling of constituency as rank that "bundles" systems, not the reverse. The systems are devised according to rank, not the reverse.

Fourthly, metafunction and rank are not based on axis. Metafunction, rank and axis are distinct dimensions, and metafunction differs from axis and rank in being a global rather than a local dimension. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Mistaking A Lower Rank Syntagm For A Higher Rank Function Structure

Martin (2013: 8-9):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this mistakes a syntagm of classes of form at phoneme rank (consonant^vowel^consonant) for a function structure at syllable rank (Onset^Nucleus^Coda). This is analogous to mistaking a syntagm of classes of form at group rank (nominal^verbal) for a function structure at clause rank (Senser^Process).

Seriously Misunderstanding The Sign In Relation To Linguistics And Semiotics

Martin (2013: 5-6):

Blogger Comments:

This seriously misunderstands both Saussure and Hjelmslev. 

For Saussure, it is the sign, signified and signifier, that is 'the borderland where the elements of sounds and thought combine', and so it is the sign where 'linguistics works'. Here Martin has mistaken the substance, sound and thought, for the form, signifier and signified.

Martin's misunderstanding arises from mistaking Saussure's discussion of language as the coupling of thought and sound (substance) for Saussure's discussion of the sign as the coupling of signified and signifier (form), as previously demonstrated at

• Mistaking Saussure's 'Language' For Saussure's 'Sign' [1]
• Mistaking Saussure's 'Language' For Saussure's 'Sign' [2]

This misunderstanding becomes more apparent when Hjelmslev's terms are substituted for Saussure's. Here Martin's claim becomes: linguistics is not concerned with content and expression, but with the line that separates these two distinct levels of abstraction.

Less importantly, Martin's coin analogy is potentially misleading, in that it misconstrues 'tails' as signifying 'heads'. 

Misunderstanding The Notion Of A Stratified Semiotic

Martin (2013: 4-5):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This mistakes planes for strata. To be clear, in SFL terminology, content and expression are planes, not strata, as in: context, content and expression. Strata are levels of symbolic abstraction within planes, most importantly, the strata of semantics and lexicogrammar that constitute the content plane.

[2] This misunderstands the meaning of 'stratified semiotic'. To be clear, the notion of language as a stratified semiotic means that its content plane is stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar. This is what differentiates language from all other semiotic systems, all of which involve content and expression planes.

[3] The diagram depicts Martin's mistaking of planes for strata by misidentifying Hjelmslev's content plane with SFL's lexicogrammar stratum and his expression plane with SFL's phonology stratum.

Misunderstanding The Saussurean Sign

Martin (2013: 2-3):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the passages just cited, Saussure was not concerned with the sign as signified and signifier, but with language as thought and sound; see the previous two posts.

[2] This "important implication" does not follow, even if Saussure had been concerned with the sign instead of language. To be clear, the signified and the signifier are distinct levels of abstraction that together constitute the sign, like meaning and form, and as such, can be referred to as distinct levels. What "matters in linguistics", in this context, is the opposition of the sign to signified and signifier, and the opposition of the signified and signifier to each other. Saussure (1959: 67):

Ambiguity would disappear if the three notions involved here were designated by three names, each suggesting and opposing the others. I propose to retain the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier [signifiant] ; the last two terms have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts.

Moreover, this is the principle of valeur applied to the words of the theory itself. The valeur of the word 'sign' is its relation to the words 'signified' and 'signifier', and vice versa, and the valeur of the words 'signified' and 'signifier' is their relation to each other.

Mistaking Saussure's Rejected Model For Saussure's 'Sign' [2]

Martin (2013: 2):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this is misleading because it is not true. Saussure uses this analogy in arguing against one view of language, not the sign. It appears in the section Language as Organised Thought Coupled with Sound. Whereas both elements of the sign are psychological, the concern here is with relating the psychological (thought) with the physical (sound=phonic substance). Saussure (1959: 112):

The linguistic fact can therefore be pictured in its totality — i.e. language — as a series of contiguous subdivisions marked off on both the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas (A) and the equally vague plane of sounds (B). The following diagram gives a rough idea of it:

The characteristic role of language with respect to thought is not to create a material phonic means for expressing ideas but to serve as a link between thought and sound, under conditions that of necessity bring about the reciprocal delimitations of units. Thought, chaotic by nature, has to become ordered in the process of its decomposition. Neither are thoughts given material form nor are sounds transformed into mental entities; the somewhat mysterious fact is rather that "thought-sound" implies division, and that language works out its units while taking shape between two shapeless masses. Visualise the air in contact with a sheet of water; if the atmospheric pressure changes, the surface of the water will be broken up into a series of divisions, waves; the waves resemble the union or coupling of thought with phonic substance.

Mistaking Saussure's Rejected Model For Saussure's 'Sign' [1]

Martin (2013: 2):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is untrue. Saussure does not use these analogies "to guard against this common-sense misunderstanding" of his sign. Saussure uses these analogies in arguing against one view of language, not the sign. They appear in the section Language as Organised Thought Coupled with Sound. Whereas both elements of the sign are psychological, the concern here is with relating the psychological (thought) with the physical (sound). Saussure is quite explicit that sound is physical rather than psychological by distinguishing sound from the word-image (signifier). Saussure (1959: 12): 

I have included only the elements thought to be essential, but the drawing brings out at a glance the distinction between the physical (sound waves), physiological (phonation and audition), and psychological parts (word-images and concepts). Indeed, we should not fail to note that the word-image stands apart from the sound itself and that it is just as psychological as the concept which is associated with it.

 Saussure (1959: 113) states the first analogy as follows:

Language can also be compared with a sheet of paper: thought is the front and the sound the back; one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time; likewise in language, one can neither divide sound from thought nor thought from sound; the division could be accomplished only abstractedly, and the result would be either pure psychology or pure phonology.

It will be seen that this misunderstanding is the source of Martin's misunderstanding of Saussure's sign in this monograph.