Monday 29 April 2024

Rebranding A Misunderstanding Of Speech Function As Negotiation

Martin (2013: 107):



Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin's system of NEGOTIATION:


is merely Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION (IFG4: 136):


with
  • information rebranded as knowledge
  • goods-&-services rebranded as action
  • giving and demanding omitted
  • the inclusion of a material-order response
  • the inclusion of material-order interlocutors.

Saturday 27 April 2024

Confusing Meaners With Meaning Potential

Martin (2013: 105-6):



Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this again confuses the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) — including even their non-verbal behaviour — with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Thursday 25 April 2024

Confusing Meaners With Meaning

 Martin (2013: 104-5):




Blogger Comments:

To be clear, knowers and actors are not language, and so do not constitute semiotic options in an exchange. Again, Martin has confused the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Tuesday 23 April 2024

Confusing Orders Of Experience

Martin (2013: 104):


Blogger Comments:

To be clear, handing over goods or providing a service is not language, and so does not constitute a semiotic exchange. Again, Martin has confused the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Sunday 21 April 2024

Misconstruing The Material As Semiotic

Martin (2013: 104):



Blogger Comments:

[1] As throughout this monograph, contrā SFL methodology, Martin here again gives priority to the view 'from below' by developing networks to account for structures,

[2] To be clear, knowledge and action are merely rebrandings of the speech function commodities information and goods-&-services, respectively.

[3] To be clear, in linguistics, the term 'prospective' is used to describe Indicating grammatically that an activity about to begin. This is the opposite of not providing a verbal response. Martin has here mistaken a material order action for a semiotic order response.

Friday 19 April 2024

Misunderstanding Rank

Martin (2013: 102):


Blogger Comments:

[1] The first sentence is misleading because it is not true. Since, by definition, an initiating move occurs earlier in a sequence than a responding move, these classifications do indeed sequence the moves.

[2] The second sentence is misleading because it is not true. For example, sequencing clauses in a clause complex does not require a higher ranking unit. Rank is a model of formal constituency (on strata that have forms). Higher ranks are motivated by having constituents.

[3] The third sentence is misleading because it is not true. The relation between ranks is not realisation, because ranks on a scale are all of the same level of symbolic abstraction. For example, the clause system of TRANSITIVITY is not realised by group functions such as Deictic and Auxiliary.

Wednesday 17 April 2024

Misunderstanding Interstratal Realisation

Martin (2013: 98-9):


Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this misunderstands realisation. Realisation is the same whether it is intra-stratal, inter-stratal, or inter-axial. Realisation is an intensive identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction, such that the lower level realises the higher level, which entails that the higher level is realised by the lower level. The standard convention is to state the relation in terms of the higher level, for which the standard symbol is a 'south-east' arrow ↘.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

At the same time, this stratal organisation means that it is crucial to specify the realisational relations between strata — inter-stratal realisation. In systemic theory, this relationship is stated in terms of the organisation of the higher stratum — for a simple reason: a higher stratum provides a more comprehensive environment than a lower one… . More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/ graphological system.

Monday 15 April 2024

Tone And Syllabification

Martin (2013: 98):


Blogger Comments:

[1] This wording is potentially misleading. It is the choice of TONE, which is the choice of pitch movement for the tonic segment of the tone group, that is relevant to the realisation of MOOD.

[2] Trivially, India comprises three syllables, /in di: ə/, so the penultimate syllable is di, not Ind.

Saturday 13 April 2024

Misunderstanding Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Martin (2013: 97):



Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, each lexical item is the synthetic realisation of a set of the most delicate grammatical features, as in Hasan's approach, not the realisation of a single grammatical feature, as in Martin's approach. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):
Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations.
An analogy can be found in phonology. For example, the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the set of features [voiced, bilabial stop], not the realisation of a single articulatory feature.

Thursday 11 April 2024

Not Recognising The Distinction Between Word As Grammatical And Word As Lexical

Martin (2013: 95): 


Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because SFL Theory also uses a constituency model, a rank scale, in which the word is a grammatical constituent. But SFL Theory also models the word as a lexical item, wherein it is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate grammatical features. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9):
The folk notion of the "word" is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. People "look for" words, they "put thoughts into" them, "put them into" or "take them out of another's mouth", and nowadays they keep collections of words on their shelves or in their computers in the form of dictionaries. Specialist knowledge is thought of as a matter of terminology. The taxonomic organisation of vocabulary is less exposed: it is made explicit in Roget's Thesaurus, but is only implicit in a standard dictionary. Lexical taxonomy was the first area of language to be systematically studied by anthropologists, when they began to explore cultural knowledge as it is embodied in folk taxonomies of plants, animals, diseases and the like.

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.. Word-based systems such as these do provide a way in to studying grammatical semantics: but the meanings they construe are always more complex than the categories that appear as formal variants, and grammarians have had to become aware of covert patterns.

Tuesday 9 April 2024

"Foregrounding" Paradigmatic Relations

Martin (2013: 95):



Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, priority is given to system over structure. Here Martin gives priority to structure over system by claiming that the purpose of paradigmatic relations is to account for structures, while simultaneously claiming the opposite: that this is "foregrounding" the paradigmatic.

Sunday 7 April 2024

What Martin Has Done In Chapter 5

Martin (2013: 93-4):


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'bundles of interdependent features' are systems, and system is the means of modelling choice across the dimensions of language, such as metafunction, rank and stratification.

[2] To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar is grammatical metaphor, and two system-structure cycles are merely the consequence of the stratification.

[3] To be clear, in giving priority to 'structural generalisations', Martin is giving priority to the view 'from below', in contradistinction to the SFL methodology of giving priority to the view 'from above'.

[4] To be clear, the number of system-structure cycles on the content plane is not an issue in SFL Theory, since it follows as a direct consequence from Halliday's original stratification.

[5] To be clear, it is only Halliday's semantics that provides a systematic account of grammatical metaphor, not Martin's discourse semantics. This is why Martin has used Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION in his discussion. The reader is invited to try using the systems of IDEATION and CONJUNCTION in Martin (1992) to describe ideational metaphor, given that both are textual grammatical systems, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, relabelled as Martin's ideational discourse semantic systems, and as such, CONJUNCTION, for example, does not account for the logico-semantic relation of projection.

Friday 5 April 2024

The Big Lie Of Chapter 5

 Martin (2013: 93):


Blogger Comments:

[1] This very misleading indeed. Martin has spent the bulk of Chapter 5 arguing that, because of grammatical metaphor, SFL needs two system-structure cycles, as if this were his idea and his argument. See also 

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

Martin furthers this false impression by falsely claiming that Halliday & Matthiessen propose a single system-structure cycle on the content plane for MODALITY, by making a false claim about their lexicogrammatical system, without considering their semantic system.

Martin makes these misleading claims to argue for his own discourse semantic systems, despite the fact that his discourse semantic stratum does not include a system of MODALITY, and he does not provide one here to demonstrate its relation to the lexicogrammatical system.

[2] To be clear, Martin's stratified social systems are his misunderstanding of linguistic registers and genres as the cultural context realised by linguistic systems.

Wednesday 3 April 2024

Falsely Finding Fault In The Mood Network Of Halliday & Matthiessen

Martin (2013: 93):


Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is not true. The feature [explicit] can be selected, and it can be realised: metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of congruently as a modal Adjunct; see previous post. There is thus no need to remove the feature [explicit] from the network.

Monday 1 April 2024

Giving Priority To Structure In Devising System

 Martin (2013: 93):


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The system of MODALITY represents the choices at clause rank. If one of these choices is realised metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of an Adjunct, it can be specified by a realisation statement attached to the feature in the network. Martin's misunderstanding here again derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', structure.

Moreover, in order to account for grammatical metaphor, it is necessary to provide both the congruent and metaphorical analyses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613-4):

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does.

[2] To be clear, the entry condition to clause complexing is the feature clause, and in this metaphor, modality is realised within a clause complex instead of within a clause.