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The Methodological Aberration That Undermines This Entire Monograph

Martin (2013: 112):

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To be clear, this encapsulates the basic methodological problem in this monograph. Where SFL Theory gives priority to the view 'from above', Martin, while claiming the opposite, gives priority to the view 'from below', by devising systems to account for structures. It is this opposite, contra-functional methodology that naturally leads Martin to call for 'restoring more of a balance between the concerns of system and structure in SFL research' (p69).

Martin's central claim that axial relations underlie the other dimensions of language has been asserted repeatedly throughout the monograph without supporting argument. Moreover, as demonstrated throughout this review, Martin misunderstands axis as axial relations, and the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes, realisation, as the realisation statements in paradigmatic systems.

Genre Staging And Phasing Lower Stratum Context Selections In The Instantiation Of Language

Martin (2013: 111):

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For some of the theoretical problems with the model of genre in Martin (1992), see the 69 posts here.

To be clear, Martin (1992) models genre as a (non-metafunctional) stratum of context, located above the systems of field, tenor and mode, which he misunderstands as systems of register. As a consequence, genres (narratives etc.) are modelled as realised by field, tenor and mode features, such as those characterising the relative social status and contact of the speaker/writer and the addressee.

To be clear, even in Martin's model, genre cannot be "a resource for staging field, tenor and mode selections in unfolding discourse" because unfolding discourse is the instantiation of language systems in logogenesis, whereas genre and field, tenor and mode are systems of different strata at the level of context, and are thus not instantiated in language.

Misunderstanding The Metafunctional Hookup

Martin (2013: 108):

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On the one hand, Martin's use of "traditionally" here is misleading, because it effaces the theorist responsible. Halliday applied the metafunctions that are intrinsic to language to the cultural context that language realises, yielding ideational field, interpersonal tenor, and textual mode.

On the other hand, this misunderstands SFL's architecture of language in context. The ideational metafunction of language is concerned with the construal of experience as meaning; the interpersonal metafunction of language is concerned with the enactment of intersubjective relations as meaning; and the textual metafunction of language is concerned with weaving ideational and interpersonal meanings together as text.

Field thus is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of the construal of experience; tenor is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of the enactment of intersubjective relations; and mode is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of weaving field and tenor together as situation.

Halliday (2003 [1994]: 437):

The mechanism proposed for this constitutive power of discourse has been referred to as the 'metafunctional hookup': the hypothesis that (a) social contexts are organic — dynamic configurations of three components, called 'field', 'tenor', and 'mode': respectively, the nature of the social activity, the relations among the interactants, and the status accorded to the language (what is going on, who are taking part, and what they are doing with their discourse); and (b) there is a relationship between these and the metafunctions such that these components are construed, respectively, as experiential, as interpersonal, and as textual meanings.

Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

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[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.

Rebranding A Misunderstanding Of Speech Function As Negotiation

Martin (2013: 107):

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To be clear, Martin's system of NEGOTIATION:

is merely Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION (IFG4: 136):

with

• information rebranded as knowledge
• goods-&-services rebranded as action
• giving and demanding omitted
• the inclusion of a material-order response
• the inclusion of material-order interlocutors.

Confusing Meaners With Meaning Potential

Martin (2013: 105-6):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this again confuses the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) — including even their non-verbal behaviour — with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Confusing Meaners With Meaning

 Martin (2013: 104-5):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, knowers and actors are not language, and so do not constitute semiotic options in an exchange. Again, Martin has confused the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Confusing Orders Of Experience

Martin (2013: 104):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, handing over goods or providing a service is not language, and so does not constitute a semiotic exchange. Again, Martin has confused the material (phenomenal) order of participants in an exchange (meaners) with the semiotic (metaphenomenal) order of their projected texts (meanings).

Misconstruing The Material As Semiotic

Martin (2013: 104):

Blogger Comments:

[1] As throughout this monograph, contrā SFL methodology, Martin here again gives priority to the view 'from below' by developing networks to account for structures,

[2] To be clear, knowledge and action are merely rebrandings of the speech function commodities information and goods-&-services, respectively.

[3] To be clear, in linguistics, the term 'prospective' is used to describe Indicating grammatically that an activity about to begin. This is the opposite of not providing a verbal response. Martin has here mistaken a material order action for a semiotic order response.

Misunderstanding Rank

Martin (2013: 102):

Blogger Comments:

[1] The first sentence is misleading because it is not true. Since, by definition, an initiating move occurs earlier in a sequence than a responding move, these classifications do indeed sequence the moves.

[2] The second sentence is misleading because it is not true. For example, sequencing clauses in a clause complex does not require a higher ranking unit. Rank is a model of formal constituency (on strata that have forms). Higher ranks are motivated by having constituents.

[3] The third sentence is misleading because it is not true. The relation between ranks is not realisation, because ranks on a scale are all of the same level of symbolic abstraction. For example, the clause system of TRANSITIVITY is not realised by group functions such as Deictic and Auxiliary.

Misunderstanding Interstratal Realisation

Martin (2013: 98-9):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this misunderstands realisation. Realisation is the same whether it is intra-stratal, inter-stratal, or inter-axial. Realisation is an intensive identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction, such that the lower level realises the higher level, which entails that the higher level is realised by the lower level. The standard convention is to state the relation in terms of the higher level, for which the standard symbol is a 'south-east' arrow ↘.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

At the same time, this stratal organisation means that it is crucial to specify the realisational relations between strata — inter-stratal realisation. In systemic theory, this relationship is stated in terms of the organisation of the higher stratum — for a simple reason: a higher stratum provides a more comprehensive environment than a lower one… . More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/ graphological system.

Tone And Syllabification

Martin (2013: 98):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This wording is potentially misleading. It is the choice of TONE, which is the choice of pitch movement for the tonic segment of the tone group, that is relevant to the realisation of MOOD.

[2] Trivially, India comprises three syllables, /in di: ə/, so the penultimate syllable is di, not Ind.

Misunderstanding Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Martin (2013: 97):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, each lexical item is the synthetic realisation of a set of the most delicate grammatical features, as in Hasan's approach, not the realisation of a single grammatical feature, as in Martin's approach. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):

Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations.

An analogy can be found in phonology. For example, the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the set of features [voiced, bilabial stop], not the realisation of a single articulatory feature.

Not Recognising The Distinction Between Word As Grammatical And Word As Lexical

Martin (2013: 95): 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because SFL Theory also uses a constituency model, a rank scale, in which the word is a grammatical constituent. But SFL Theory also models the word as a lexical item, wherein it is the synthetic realisation of the most delicate grammatical features. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568-9):

The folk notion of the "word" is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical and one grammatical.

(i) Vocabulary (lexis): the word as lexical item, or "lexeme". This is construed as an isolate, a 'thing' that can be counted and sorted in (alphabetical) order. People "look for" words, they "put thoughts into" them, "put them into" or "take them out of another's mouth", and nowadays they keep collections of words on their shelves or in their computers in the form of dictionaries. Specialist knowledge is thought of as a matter of terminology. The taxonomic organisation of vocabulary is less exposed: it is made explicit in Roget's Thesaurus, but is only implicit in a standard dictionary. Lexical taxonomy was the first area of language to be systematically studied by anthropologists, when they began to explore cultural knowledge as it is embodied in folk taxonomies of plants, animals, diseases and the like.

(ii) Grammar: the word as one of the ranks in the grammatical system. This is, not surprisingly, where Western linguistic theory as we know it today began in classical times, with the study of words varying in form according to their case, number, aspect, person etc.. Word-based systems such as these do provide a way in to studying grammatical semantics: but the meanings they construe are always more complex than the categories that appear as formal variants, and grammarians have had to become aware of covert patterns.

"Foregrounding" Paradigmatic Relations

Martin (2013: 95):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, priority is given to system over structure. Here Martin gives priority to structure over system by claiming that the purpose of paradigmatic relations is to account for structures, while simultaneously claiming the opposite: that this is "foregrounding" the paradigmatic.

What Martin Has Done In Chapter 5

Martin (2013: 93-4):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'bundles of interdependent features' are systems, and system is the means of modelling choice across the dimensions of language, such as metafunction, rank and stratification.

[2] To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar is grammatical metaphor, and two system-structure cycles are merely the consequence of the stratification.

[3] To be clear, in giving priority to 'structural generalisations', Martin is giving priority to the view 'from below', in contradistinction to the SFL methodology of giving priority to the view 'from above'.

[4] To be clear, the number of system-structure cycles on the content plane is not an issue in SFL Theory, since it follows as a direct consequence from Halliday's original stratification.

[5] To be clear, it is only Halliday's semantics that provides a systematic account of grammatical metaphor, not Martin's discourse semantics. This is why Martin has used Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION in his discussion. The reader is invited to try using the systems of IDEATION and CONJUNCTION in Martin (1992) to describe ideational metaphor, given that both are textual grammatical systems, LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, relabelled as Martin's ideational discourse semantic systems, and as such, CONJUNCTION, for example, does not account for the logico-semantic relation of projection.

The Big Lie Of Chapter 5

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This very misleading indeed. Martin has spent the bulk of Chapter 5 arguing that, because of grammatical metaphor, SFL needs two system-structure cycles, as if this were his idea and his argument. See also 

• Falsely Claiming That The Content Plane Was Not Stratified Before Martin (1992).
• On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures.

Martin furthers this false impression by falsely claiming that Halliday & Matthiessen propose a single system-structure cycle on the content plane for MODALITY, by making a false claim about their lexicogrammatical system, without considering their semantic system.

Martin makes these misleading claims to argue for his own discourse semantic systems, despite the fact that his discourse semantic stratum does not include a system of MODALITY, and he does not provide one here to demonstrate its relation to the lexicogrammatical system.

[2] To be clear, Martin's stratified social systems are his misunderstanding of linguistic registers and genres as the cultural context realised by linguistic systems.

Falsely Finding Fault In The Mood Network Of Halliday & Matthiessen

Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it is not true. The feature [explicit] can be selected, and it can be realised: metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of congruently as a modal Adjunct; see previous post. There is thus no need to remove the feature [explicit] from the network.

Giving Priority To Structure In Devising System

 Martin (2013: 93):

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The system of MODALITY represents the choices at clause rank. If one of these choices is realised metaphorically as a projecting mental clause instead of an Adjunct, it can be specified by a realisation statement attached to the feature in the network. Martin's misunderstanding here again derives from giving priority to the view 'from below', structure.

Moreover, in order to account for grammatical metaphor, it is necessary to provide both the congruent and metaphorical analyses. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613-4):

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does.

[2] To be clear, the entry condition to clause complexing is the feature clause, and in this metaphor, modality is realised within a clause complex instead of within a clause.

The Motivation For Speech Function vs Mood

Martin (2013: 83, 84):

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To be clear, the motivation for stratifying the entire content plane into semantic and lexicogrammatical systems is grammatical metaphor. So in the case of Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION and grammatical system of MOOD, interpersonal metaphors of mood motivate their stratification. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

Misunderstanding 'From Above' And Rebranding Speech Function As Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 82-3):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misunderstands looking 'from above' as looking 'above' — i.e. from below. Again, this is the direct opposite of SFL methodology. Instead of being concerned with how meaning is realised, Martin is concerned with what wording realises.

[2] Here Martin misleads by rebranding Halliday's semantic system of speech function as Martin's discourse semantic system, which Martin himself proposes.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [2]

Martin (2013: 81):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

Misrepresenting Interpersonal Metaphor Of Mood

Martin (2013: 80-1):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'stratal tension between discourse function and MOOD' is the incongruent (metaphorical) realisation of SPEECH FUNCTION in MOOD. 

[2] To be clear, the metaphorical realisations do not "dress themselves up lexicogrammatically as commands". Lexicogrammatically, they are just like any other indicative clauses. The difference is semantic, not lexicogrammatical, since they realise proposals (demanding goods-&-services) rather than propositions (giving or demanding information) in terms of SPEECH FUNCTION.

Misunderstanding Congruent vs Metaphorical As Encoding vs Symbolising [1]

Martin (2013: 80):

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, here Martin misleads by misrepresenting Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantics.

[2] To be clear, grammatical structure realises (not "reflects") choices made in the MOOD system.

[3] To be clear, 'congruent' is Halliday's technical term for the agreement between semantics and grammar.

[4] To be clear, this seriously misunderstands realisation and grammatical metaphor. Realisation is the relation of symbolic abstraction, and 'symbolising' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar, irrespective of whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical. In encoding, the lower level of abstraction (lexicogrammar) is used to identify the higher level of abstraction (semantics), and does not depend on whether the realisation is congruent or metaphorical.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Speech Function As Martin's Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 78-9):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, speech function is Halliday's system of interpersonal semantics. Here Martin misleads the reader by misrepresenting speech function as a system of his model of discourse semantics.

Looking Up To Discourse Semantics

Martin (2013: 78):

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[1] Again, here Martin misconstrues looking 'from above' as looking 'above' ("up"), and misleads by using this misinterpretation to claim that it is important to look at his discourse semantics, since it may be a rich source of interpreting grammatical structure.

[2] This misunderstands the significance of Halliday's observation of the natural relation between grammatical form and meaning — a relation which is not accommodated by Martin's discourse semantics. Halliday (1985: xvii, xviii, xix):

The relation between the meaning and the wording is not, however, an arbitrary one: the form of the grammar relates naturally to the meanings that are being encoded. A functional grammar is designed to bring this out; it is a study of wording, but one that interprets the wording by reference to what it means. …

What this means is that both the general kinds of grammatical pattern that have evolved in language, and the specific manifestations of each kind, bear a natural relation to the meanings they have evolved to express. … the distinction into word classes of verb and noun reflects the analysis of experience into goings-on, expressed as verbs, and participants in the goings-on, expressed as nouns; and so on. …

… the relation of grammar to semantics is in this sense natural, not arbitrary …

Misunderstanding The Trinocular Perspective On Strata

Martin (2013: 77-8):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, viewing a nominal group 'from above', stratally, means viewing the grammar from above: seeing the grammatical unit as the realisation of meaning; for example, as the congruent realisation of a participant element, or as the metaphorical realisation of a figure or sequence.

Importantly, it is not the nominal group that is 'evaluated' and 'tracked in the text' but the meaning that it realises. So these are not viewing the grammar from above, but instead just viewing the stratum above: semantics.

Similarly, viewing 'from below' stratally means viewing the grammar from below: as wording that is realised phonologically or graphologically. Again, it is not the nominal group that has rhythmic structure, but the prosodic phonology that realises it, and not the nominal group that is spelt with an initial upper case, but the graphology that realises it. So this is not viewing the grammar 'from below' but instead viewing the stratum below: phonology or graphology.

In short, Martin misconstrues viewing 'from above' as viewing 'above', and viewing 'from below' as viewing 'below'.

Misunderstanding The Trinocular Perspective

 Martin (2013: 77):

Blogger Comments:

This misunderstands the trinocular perspective, since the trinocular perspective is concerned with levels of symbolic abstraction, whereas rank is a composition hierarchy, not a hierarchy of symbolic abstraction. That is, clauses are composed of groups, not realised by them; groups are composed of words, not realised by them. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) explain:

A stratified semiotic defines three perspectives, which (following the most familiar metaphor) we refer to as 'from above', 'from roundabout', and 'from below': looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content, looking at it from below means treating it as the content of some expression, while looking at it from roundabout means treating it in the context of (i.e. in relation to other features of) its own stratum.

The Problem Of Grouping Declarative With Imperative

Martin (2013: 77):

Blogger Comments:

[1] For the generalisation lost in Martin's network, see the previous post.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the grammar is interpreted as the realisation of meaning. So declarative is "grouped" with interrogative, not imperative, under the superordinate indicative, because these two types of indicative are the congruent realisation of propositions, in contradistinction to imperative, which is the congruent realisation of a proposal.

[3] To be clear, the structural realisation of TENSE is specified in a verbal group network, not a clause network.

[4] To be clear, the problem with the MOOD network in Halliday & Matthiessen is easily rectified by adding a superscript 'I' to the system INDICATIVE TYPE, and a superscript 'T' to the system COMMENT. Problems with Martin's networks are not so easily rectified, as this blog has demonstrated.

Misrepresenting Comment Adjuncts

Martin (2013: 76-7):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this network is poorly wired, since there is no need for two sets of wiring from the 'declarative' and 'interrogative' features if the two more delicate systems are represented as conjunctive systems (grouped by a curly bracket).

[2] To be clear, comment Adjuncts, according to Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 190):

express the speaker’s attitude either to the proposition as a whole or to the particular speech function. In other words, the target of the comment may be either ideational (the content of the proposition) or interpersonal (the speech function).

That is, the distinction is not one of 'feeling' vs 'dialogism', since both types express an attitude, and both types — e.g. arguably vs broadly — can serve a dialogistic function.

Prioritising The Perspective Of Tagging

Martin (2013: 75-6):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the perspective that Martin prioritises by making it criterial is the opposite perspective to that taken in the methodology of a functional grammar. That is, instead of organising a system on the basis of meaningful distinctions and then stipulating how these are realised structurally, Martin organises a system on the basis of the realisation: whether or not the meaningful choice is realised by a Mood Tag. Importantly, the central argument of this monograph rests on Martin, throughout, mistakenly giving priority to the view 'from below', while claiming the opposite.