Giving Priority To Structure And Form Over System And Function

Martin (2013: 21-2):

Once thou was lost, English speakers would have had to deploy alternative resources to negotiate their social relations. And this means that we need to revise our pronoun network for standard English, as outlined below (setting aside GENDER for the moment to simplify the presentation).

It might be objected that we should keep the same system we developed for Shakespeare's times, and simply allow you to realise both second person singular and plural; this is the grammarian's concept of neutralisation. But we're going to be very stringent in our introduction to axial relations here and argue that if there is no difference in structure then there is no difference in system. Accordingly, we oppose above first and third person pronouns that distinguish NUMBER to second person pronouns which don't. This illustrates a very important strategy for network drawing — namely, setting aside, as early in delicacy as possible, classes that in some sense lie outside the system. Since you is different from other pronouns, we set it aside, and then move on to capture the parameters that the rest of the system shares.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, interlocutors enact their social relations. A child does not negotiate her status or institutional role with a teacher. Negotiating propositions and proposals is a different matter.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, it wasn't that thou was lost and speakers were forced to 'deploy alternative resources'. It was because speakers 'deployed alternative resources' that the use of thou diminished.

[3] To be clear, this is the methodology of SFL Theory, where priority is given to system and function over structure and form. Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 62):

[4] To be clear, the relation between the axes is simply realisation.

[5] This is misleading. To be clear, this approach gives priority to structure over system, the exact opposite of SFL methodology. Martin (p10) has previously acknowledged SFL methodology:

so his contradiction here demonstrates that he does not understand what it means to give priority to system over structure. The misunderstanding also invalidates the fundamental premise of this monograph.

[6] This is misleading. To be clear, this is again giving priority to form (pronouns, classes) over function, the exact opposite of SFL methodology.

Giving Priority To The View 'From Below' [2]

Martin (2013: 20):

Blogger Comments:

Again, this network is misleading in that it misrepresents the approach of SFL Theory. To be clear:

1. the realisations of these features are not structures, or even functions, but grammatical form (pronouns),
2. the features 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, and
3. the network gives priority to the view 'from below' instead of 'from above', since it is using form to derive systems.

On this last point, the method of SFL Theory is to identify how meanings are expressed, but Martin's method is to identify what expressions mean.

Cf. Matthiessen (1995: 390):

Giving Priority To The View 'From Below' [1]

Martin (2013: 19-20):

Blogger Comments:

This network is misleading in that it misrepresents the approach of SFL Theory. To be clear:

1. the realisations of these features are not structures, or even functions, but grammatical form (pronouns),
2. the features 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, and
3. the network gives priority to the view 'from below' instead of 'from above', since it is using form to derive systems.

On this last point, the method of SFL Theory is to identify how meanings are expressed, but Martin's method is to identify what expressions mean.

Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 62):

… there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2):

This intersects with a system of NUMBER, opposing ‘one’ to ‘more than one’ (see Figure 2-3).

The way these two combine varies among different languages; for the version found in (modern standard) English, see Table 2-1 and, for further detail, Chapter 6.

Misunderstanding The Labelling Of Systems And Features

Martin (2013: 19):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, systems and their features are labelled according to the functions that they distinguish. Because 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not functions, but formal categories, they do not feature in system networks. That is the problem Martin has unnecessarily created by using them.

Clearly, the terms 'first', 'second' and 'third' are not "rather arbitrary" and do not "privilege" the speaker. They merely present the perspective of the person actually producing the text. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 383-4):

The personal pronoun represents the world according to the speaker, in the context of a speech exchange. The basic distinction is into speech roles (I, you) and other roles (he, she, it, they); there is also the generalised pronoun (one). These categories are set out in Figure 6-4.

The Fundamental Misunderstanding Of Axis In This Monograph

Martin (2013: 19):

The realisation of this system in structure has also been specified, with the words I, thou and he following the downward slanting arrow angled from upper left to lower right (the arrow represents 'is realised by'). In this form the system network formalises both the paradigmatic relations and their structural consequences (i.e. the units realising them). This dimension of SFL analysis is called axis. Axis privileges system over structure, with features realised through structure and structure motivating system (in other words, if no structural consequence, then no system).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading because it is untrue. The network does not even specify any elements of structure, let alone structure. All it specifies is the grammatical form (pronouns) and their formal categories in terms of person. It even contradicts Martin's introduction which opposed words to structure; Martin (2013: 14):

To be clear, structure is constituted by the relationships among the functional elements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

A multivariate structure is a configuration of different functional relationships, like Theme + Rheme, Mood + Residue + Moodtag, or Actor + Process + Recipient + Goal. Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue, since a formal unit realising a feature does not constitute a structure, as explained above. What is true is that the system of a unit, such as a clause, is realised by the structure of that unit.

[3] This is misleading because it is untrue. Axis is a local dimension of language with two orders, paradigmatic and syntagmatic, whose dimensions are system and structure, respectively (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20, 32). Here Martin misunderstands axis as the systemic specification of syntagmatic units. As Halliday (2003 [1994]: 434) explains, such specifications are a component of systems, the paradigmatic order of axis only:

The system has one further component, namely the 'realisation statement' that accompanies each option. This specifies the contribution made by that option to the structural configuration; it may be read as a proposition about the structural constraints associated with the option in question.

[4] This is misleading because it is untrue. It is not axis that "privileges" system over structure but SFL Theory. Halliday (2003 [1994]: 433):

In Firth's system-structure theory, neither of these is given priority; and in scale and category grammar this perspective was maintained. In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms.

[5] This is potentially misleading, especially in this context. To be clear, individual features are not realised by structure; it is a system of features that is realised by the relationships among the functional elements of structure.

[6] To be clear, here Martin is giving priority to structure over system, thereby contradicting his own misunderstanding of axis, and taking the opposite perspective to that of SFL Theory.

[7] To be clear, Martin has already provided two networks that contradict this claim: the PERSON system above, and traffic light system (p3):

Moreover, as Halliday (2003 [1994]: 433-4) explains:

In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. … This step was taken by Halliday in the early 1960s so that grammatical and phonological representations could be freed from constraints of structure.

Systemising Form Instead Of Function

 Martin (2013: 18-9):





Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, in Systemic Functional Linguistics, system networks are used to model function not form. This network models forms (pronouns) in terms of the formal categories (1st, 2nd, 3rd). Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: ):

As discussed in Chapter 1, grammatical categories are organized in systems. For example, there is a system of PERSON, based (in English, as in most other languages) on the opposition of ‘you-&-me’ versus ‘everyone (and perhaps everything) else’, and then on that of ‘you’ as opposed to ‘me’ (see Figure 2-2):

To be clear, PERSON is an interpersonal subsystem of the nominal group for distinguishing interactants, and these from others. Matthiessen (1995: 11):

Outline Of Chapter 6

Martin (2013: 11):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 6.

Firstly, the intonational system of TONE realises the system of KEY, not MOOD. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 168):

The tones are not, however, simply additional markers attached to the realisation of mood. They realise distinct grammatical systems of their own, which are associated with the mood categories. The general name for systems that are realised by tone is KEY. The term KEY covers a number of systems;

Secondly, rank is a way of modelling formal constituency, but semantics has no form, and so no formal constituency to model as a rank scale.

Thirdly, the 'probabilistic perspective' relates the cline of instantiation, not with any one stratum, such as context. For example, for context, the instantiation probabilities of field, tenor and mode features distinguish one situation type from another, and for language, the instantiation probabilities of content plane features distinguishes one register from another.

Outline Of Chapter 5

Martin (2013: 11):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 5.

Firstly, it is stratification, metafunction and rank that "bundle" systems together, not the reverse. The systems are devised according to the principles of strata, metafunction and rank, not the reverse.

Secondly, even within the misunderstanding that the "bundling" of systems is the basis of stratification, metafunction and rank, axis cannot be key. Stratification, metafunction, rank and axis are distinct dimensions, and stratification and metafunction differ from axis and rank in being a global rather than local dimensions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Outline Of Chapter 4

Martin (2013: 10-1):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 4.

Firstly, it is not language that "privileges" systems over structure or formalises systemic relations as system networks but Systemic Functional Linguistics. Here Martin mistakes the data for the theory.

Secondly, it is the principles underlying the metafunctions that "bundle" clause systems, not the reverse. The metafunctions give rise to the systems, not the reverse. The systems are devised according to the metafunctions, not the reverse.

Thirdly, it is the modelling of constituency as rank that "bundles" systems, not the reverse. The systems are devised according to rank, not the reverse.

Fourthly, metafunction and rank are not based on axis. Metafunction, rank and axis are distinct dimensions, and metafunction differs from axis and rank in being a global rather than a local dimension. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

Outline Of Chapter 3

Martin (2013: 10):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 3.

Firstly, the distinction between class (e.g. verbal group) and function (e.g. process) is not a distinction between categories and relations, since both are categories, and neither are relations.

Secondly, realisation statements are not used to derive structure from system, since realisation statements only specify such things as the insertion of an element, or the ordering of elements in a structure. No realisation statement specifies a structure: the relationships among functions such as Senser^Process^Phenomenon.

Thirdly, because of this, realisation statements do not "formalise" the complementarity of system and structure.

Outline Of Chapter 2

Martin (2013: 10):

Blogger Comments:

This foreshadows the misleading misunderstandings to appear in Chapter 2. For example, the realisations specified in Martin's PERSON systems are grammatical items (I, thou, he etc.) that may realise a function (e.g. Thing as Subject), not structures. A structure is the relationships among functions. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Mistaking A Lower Rank Syntagm For A Higher Rank Function Structure

Martin (2013: 8-9):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this mistakes a syntagm of classes of form at phoneme rank (consonant^vowel^consonant) for a function structure at syllable rank (Onset^Nucleus^Coda). This is analogous to mistaking a syntagm of classes of form at group rank (nominal^verbal) for a function structure at clause rank (Senser^Process).

Misunderstanding Units, Elements And Systems As Relationships

Martin (2013: 7):

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because none of these is a term for a relationship, since:

• noun is a term for a class of formal constituent,
• clause is a term for a formal constituent,
• Subject and Theme are terms for elements of structure,
• DEIXIS and TRANSITIVITY are terms for systems in which features are paradigmatically related.

Martin has simply mistaken what can be in a relationship with the relationship itself. For example:

• A noun can be in paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships with other words.
• A clause can be in paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships with other clauses.
• A Subject can be in a syntagmatic relationship with other elements of mood structure.
• A Theme can be in a syntagmatic relationship with other elements of thematic structure.
• A system of DEIXIS can be in paradigmatic relationship with other systems of the nominal group.
• A system of TRANSITIVITY can be in paradigmatic relationship with other systems of the clause.

It will be seen later that Martin mistakes an element of structure for the structural relationship itself.

Misrepresenting The Basic Unit Of Meaning In Halliday's Semantics

Martin (2013: 6-7):

Blogger Comments:

This pretext for using 'discourse semantics' is very misleading indeed, not least because it is knowingly untrue. Firstly, in Halliday's version of his own theory, the basic unit of meaning is the text, not the clause.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 44):

The basic unit of semantics is the text – language functioning in context … . A text is organised internally as patterns of logical, experiential, interpersonal and textual meaning.

The clause is the highest ranked constituent of wording (lexicogrammar), not meaning (semantics).

Secondly, since the 'sentence' (i.e. clause complex) is wording, not meaning, relations syntagmatically beyond this structure are theorised at the level of wording, as lexicogrammatical cohesion. For evidence that Martin's discourse semantics is largely a rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's lexicogrammatical cohesion, see the 61 posts here, and the 83 posts here.

Seriously Misunderstanding The Sign In Relation To Linguistics And Semiotics

Martin (2013: 5-6):

Blogger Comments:

This seriously misunderstands both Saussure and Hjelmslev. 

For Saussure, it is the sign, signified and signifier, that is 'the borderland where the elements of sounds and thought combine', and so it is the sign where 'linguistics works'. Here Martin has mistaken the substance, sound and thought, for the form, signifier and signified.

Martin's misunderstanding arises from mistaking Saussure's discussion of language as the coupling of thought and sound (substance) for Saussure's discussion of the sign as the coupling of signified and signifier (form), as previously demonstrated at

• Mistaking Saussure's 'Language' For Saussure's 'Sign' [1]
• Mistaking Saussure's 'Language' For Saussure's 'Sign' [2]

This misunderstanding becomes more apparent when Hjelmslev's terms are substituted for Saussure's. Here Martin's claim becomes: linguistics is not concerned with content and expression, but with the line that separates these two distinct levels of abstraction.

Less importantly, Martin's coin analogy is potentially misleading, in that it misconstrues 'tails' as signifying 'heads'.