The Methodological Aberration That Undermines This Entire Monograph

Martin (2013: 112):

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, this encapsulates the basic methodological problem in this monograph. Where SFL Theory gives priority to the view 'from above', Martin, while claiming the opposite, gives priority to the view 'from below', by devising systems to account for structures. It is this opposite, contra-functional methodology that naturally leads Martin to call for 'restoring more of a balance between the concerns of system and structure in SFL research' (p69).

Martin's central claim that axial relations underlie the other dimensions of language has been asserted repeatedly throughout the monograph without supporting argument. Moreover, as demonstrated throughout this review, Martin misunderstands axis as axial relations, and the relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes, realisation, as the realisation statements in paradigmatic systems.

Genre Staging And Phasing Lower Stratum Context Selections In The Instantiation Of Language

Martin (2013: 111):

Blogger Comments:

For some of the theoretical problems with the model of genre in Martin (1992), see the 69 posts here.

To be clear, Martin (1992) models genre as a (non-metafunctional) stratum of context, located above the systems of field, tenor and mode, which he misunderstands as systems of register. As a consequence, genres (narratives etc.) are modelled as realised by field, tenor and mode features, such as those characterising the relative social status and contact of the speaker/writer and the addressee.

To be clear, even in Martin's model, genre cannot be "a resource for staging field, tenor and mode selections in unfolding discourse" because unfolding discourse is the instantiation of language systems in logogenesis, whereas genre and field, tenor and mode are systems of different strata at the level of context, and are thus not instantiated in language.

Misunderstanding The Metafunctional Hookup

Martin (2013: 108):

Blogger Comments:

On the one hand, Martin's use of "traditionally" here is misleading, because it effaces the theorist responsible. Halliday applied the metafunctions that are intrinsic to language to the cultural context that language realises, yielding ideational field, interpersonal tenor, and textual mode.

On the other hand, this misunderstands SFL's architecture of language in context. The ideational metafunction of language is concerned with the construal of experience as meaning; the interpersonal metafunction of language is concerned with the enactment of intersubjective relations as meaning; and the textual metafunction of language is concerned with weaving ideational and interpersonal meanings together as text.

Field thus is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of the construal of experience; tenor is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of the enactment of intersubjective relations; and mode is concerned with the culture as a semiotic system in terms of weaving field and tenor together as situation.

Halliday (2003 [1994]: 437):

The mechanism proposed for this constitutive power of discourse has been referred to as the 'metafunctional hookup': the hypothesis that (a) social contexts are organic — dynamic configurations of three components, called 'field', 'tenor', and 'mode': respectively, the nature of the social activity, the relations among the interactants, and the status accorded to the language (what is going on, who are taking part, and what they are doing with their discourse); and (b) there is a relationship between these and the metafunctions such that these components are construed, respectively, as experiential, as interpersonal, and as textual meanings.

Misunderstanding Rank, Realisation And Metaphor

Martin (2013: 107):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, higher ranks are not realised by lower ranks: a clause is not realised by a group, for example. Instead, higher ranks consist of lower ranks. Since NEGOTIATION and SPEECH FUNCTION are claimed to be systems of different ranks, NEGOTIATION is not realised by SPEECH FUNCTION. Instead, an exchange consists of moves, as in the SPEECH FUNCTION model. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 137):

[2] To be clear, the obvious speech function equivalent of K2 is a demand for information, a question, and the obvious speech function equivalent of A1f is a giving of information, a statement.

[3] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is "reasoned" from above, not from below. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 604) point out:

looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content

In a metaphor of mood, the choice of MOOD is an incongruent expression of content (speech function).

[4] As previously explained, NEGOTIATION does not provide a means of viewing SPEECH FUNCTION from above, because it is merely a rebranded version of SPEECH FUNCTION.

[5] To be clear, the semantic "unity" of the speech function 'offer' is provided by its definition as 'give' + 'goods-&-services'. Martin's questioning of this again derives from his taking the view 'from below' — how offers are realised grammatically — since offers do not have one congruent grammatical realisation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 195):

For statements and questions there is a clear pattern of congruence: typically, a statement is realised as declarative and a question as interrogative – but at the same time in both instances there are alternative realisations. For offers and commands the picture is even less determinate. A command is usually cited, in grammatical examples, as imperative, but it is just as likely to be a modulated interrogative or declarative, as in Will you be quiet?, You must keep quiet!; while for offers there is no distinct mood category at all, just a special interrogative form shall I ...?, shall we ...?, which again is simply one possible realisation among many.